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ABSTRACT 
Hillary Smith: Understanding the entanglements between wealth status and equitable forest based 
livelihood outcomes under different decentralized contexts in Tanzania; Does community based forest 
management have an equalizing effect? 
(Under the direction of Dr. Lauren Persha) 
 
Decentralized natural resource management is now widely implemented across the developing 
world, however much uncertainty remains over whether such programs really achieve their mulit-
faceted aims, and how they should be structured at local levels to be equitable and effective. In the 
forest sector this increasingly popular paradigm is intended to improve forest conservation, governance 
and local livelihoods in parallel. While forest outcomes have received greater attention in existing 
literature there is less empirical support or clarity around how forest sector decentralization effects the 
equity of governance and livelihood outcomes. This study seeks to understand how greater levels of 
decentralized community rights and responsibilities under a “pro poor” Community Based Forest 
Management (CBFM) regime functions to attenuate elite capture, or instead reproduce existing 
marginalities within communities. To do so I exploit the co-occurrence of CBFM regimes alongside of 
state forests and state-community co-managed forests. Where these regimes are adjacent provides the 
opportunity to better understand how a household’s access to CBFM might alter their participation in 
forest institutions and access to resources shifting the trajectory of outcomes. To do so extensive 
quantitative and qualitative household survey data are analyzed from 349 households drawn from 12 
communities with state or co-managed forests where half of the sample additionally have CBFM 
processes. Particular attention is paid to whether there is any evidence of positive spillover effects, 
interactions or trade-offs across governance or livelihood objectives attributable to the presence of 
CBFM. To connect these separate policy objectives this study draws conclusions as to whether 
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institutions for forest governance may serve as a pathway to changing livelihood benefits, and ways in 
which pre-existing household wealth status mediate access to both.
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CHAPTER 1: LINKS BETWEEN POVERTY AND FOREST SECTOR DECENTRALIZATION IN CONTEXT 
Introduction 
The spatial overlap between severe poverty and remaining forest cover globally points to critical 
entanglements between linked human and natural systems which require further exploration (Sunderlin 
et al. 2008). Globally, forests play a critical role supporting human wellbeing indirectly through their 
myriad ecosystem services. However for millions of people forests are directly relied upon as a vital 
component of subsistence life (Sunderlin et al. 2005, Vedeld et al. 2007). Direct reliance on forests is 
mostly confined to poorer, rural areas within developing countries and is often less visible to those 
outside these spaces (Sunderlin et al. 2008). Therefore the diversity of resources and true significance of 
forests to rural livelihoods have often remained obscured as a “hidden harvest” overlooked or 
misunderstood among scientific and development communities (Angelsen 2003, Cavendish 2000, 
Campbell and Luckert 2002, Campbell 2002).  
Accounting for the existence of informal economies, fluid livelihood strategies, and subsistence 
offsetting make estimating the local value of forests especially difficult. Due to these characteristics 
traditional approaches to studying rural socioeconomic systems critically underestimated income 
derived from natural resources such as forests. This repeated oversight ultimately undervalued the 
importance of forests to local livelihoods (Angelsen 2003, Vedeld et al. 2007, Jagger 2012). Theories 
around the development of sustainable livelihoods now conceptualize rural household strategies as a 
dynamic and diverse portfolio of activities (Ellis 2000). Within the realm of diversification forests may 
serve as an important source of natural capital feeding into a variety of livelihood activities (Ellis 2000).  
Three distinct functions forests fulfill in supporting livelihoods are now recognized including forests as a
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a safety net in times of shortfall, as support for current consumption, and as a means of capital 
accumulation to achieve a path out of poverty (Cavendish 2003, Angelsen 2003). These functions are 
believed to be particularly important for the severely poor (Sunderlin et al. 2005).  
Theoretical advances and the growing body of literature linking poverty, forests and livelihoods 
have drawn attention to forests’ potential to alleviate rural poverty (Sunderlin et al. 2005, Vedeld et al. 
2007). However, others are less certain that forests are affecting global poverty in any meaningful way 
(Sunderlin et al. 2005). While some are critical that forests as a “path out of poverty” is simply too 
optimistic (Sunderlin et al. 2005), others point out that the common modes of forest management have 
long prevented adequate forest access (Angelsen 2003, Vedeld 2004). In order to obtain forest benefits 
and affect a household’s relative poverty forest resources must first be accessible. A broad set of social 
factors differentiate the relationships between individuals and their relative access to resources (Ribot 
and Peluso 2003). Forest access depends on multiple formal and informal processes including both de 
jure property rights and de facto institutional processes that shape them (Ostrom 1990). These 
processes can overlap unevenly creating disparities in households’ relative power to derive forest 
benefits despite the same legal claim to resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Attention has been drawn in 
the last two decades to how institutions of governance can shape human-environment relationships and 
mediate access to natural resources particularly among poor, resource-dependent people. A better 
understanding of how these processes regulate household access to forests is especially important given 
recent global changes in forest conservation policy.  
Amidst the larger paradigm shift towards community based natural resource management 
forest sector decentralization is increasingly popular for its potential to improve upon relevant social 
and ecological outcomes. These outcomes are consistently theorized to include improved forest 
conservation, functioning of local governance and livelihoods. Decentralization entails the downward 
transfer of autonomous rights over a domain such as forests to lower tiers of the political administrative 
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hierarchy (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). In the context of the rapid shift towards forest sector 
decentralization management rights are typically devolved from centralized forest departments to 
village government bodies. By transferring management rights and responsibilities to communities 
decentralization is posited to jointly improve the equity and efficiency of forest conservation, 
governance and local livelihoods (Ribot 2004). These improvements are anticipated from the 
“democratic dividend” effect whereby greater efficiency and equity emerge as positive externalities by 
the presence of more democratic processes of governance (Ribot 2002). Local institutions of 
government are believed to be more responsive and accountable to their constituents enabling greater 
transparency, information, and popular participation around the processes and therefore thought to be 
both more responsive and representative of local needs than a centralized body (Ribot 2002).  
However, understanding of how changes in forest management policies affect outcomes is not 
clear nor is any unanimous picture of improvement based on the sparse empirical evidence (Treisman 
2007, Ribot 2004). Empirical evaluation of decentralization and livelihood outcomes are relatively scarce 
compared to assessments of forest level outcomes (Jagger 2012, Angelsen et al. 2014, Jagger et al. 
2014). Most existing work on livelihoods focus on community level outcomes. This aggregate level may 
not detect heterogeneous effects within communities and how forest access and outcomes may differ 
across marginalized sub-groups within communities. This research aims to address how the institutional 
arrangements under different decentralized forest management contexts shape households access to 
forest livelihoods in Tanzania. Focusing on Tanzania provides an opportunity to evaluate a decentralized 
forest sector with both a relatively long history and reputation as a model for policy implementation on 
the continent yet lacks robust empirical evaluation to bolster such claims.  Drawing on data from 349 
households across different combinations of participatory and centralized forest management 
arrangements enables exploration of the effects of decentralization on interrelated governance and 
livelihood outcomes. By exploring the links between wealth status, governance and forest livelihoods 
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this research aims to unpack the processes by which households gain access to forest benefits and 
whether “pro poor” decentralized management regimes enable more equitable outcomes in practice.   
History of Managing Forests as Common Pool Resources 
Forests’ potential to contribute to rural livelihoods and poverty reduction has been restricted by 
the global ascendency of western forest conservation ideology (Hurst 2003, Neumann 1997, Weddell 
2002, Kalamandeen and Gillson 2007). Scientific forestry developed in European schools educated a 
cadre of foresters trained to manage forests for timber production while conserving others to secure 
sufficient ecosystem services (Hurst 2003). Forested landscapes were separated under this approach 
into exploitable stands for timber production and reserves chosen for preservation; both designed to 
accrue particular benefits for the state with disproportionate costs borne by forest adjacent 
communities (Schwartzman, Moreira and Nepstad 2000, Hurst 2003). This focus on designating large 
swaths of pristine forest as strict protected areas is commonly referred to as fortress conservation 
(Schwartzman et al. 2000). This exclusionary agenda hinged on the belief that human presence and the 
persistence of biodiverse forests were inherently at odds (Redford 1992, Redford and Stearman 1993, 
Brandon, Redford and Sanderson 1998). These practices were motivated by simplistic assumptions that 
human access caused unchecked resource degradation driven by the livelihood practices and inevitable 
resource overuse by the rural poor (Reardon and Vosti 1995). These assumptions continued to permeate 
both conservation policy and academic writing for much of the 20th century with a focus on prescriptive 
tenure solutions particularly in the case of common pool resources.  
Forests are common pool resource (CPR) systems which are characterized by particular features 
and related management challenges. CPRs are defined by two overarching characteristics; the difficulty 
of exclusion from the resource system and the subtractability of resource units (Ostrom 1990; 30). The 
nature of CPR systems makes excluding outside beneficiaries challenging. Exclusion is considered pivotal 
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to internalize costs and benefits associated with making long term investments in management and 
future resource provisioning (Ostrom 1990; 30, Dietz, Ostrom and Stern 2003). CPR systems are likely to 
suffer from compounding over exploitation if free riders who do not contribute to the costs of resource 
maintenance cannot be excluded from obtaining the benefits (Hardin 1968). The problem of exclusion 
from the resource system is exasperated by the subtractability of the resource units. While the resource 
system as a whole may be jointly owned, individual resource units (such as trees) cannot be 
concurrently consumed (Ostrom 1990; 31). Therefore any one user’s consumption subtracts from all 
others future use. 
 Garett Hardin’s (1968) infamous essay coined the term the “tragedy of the commons” to 
describe the cycle of resource over use and subsequent demise observed in some CPR systems. In 
Hardin’s description users are entrenched in an inevitable trap of unsustainable exploitation bound by 
the attributes of CPR systems and his assumptions about human behavior. The tragedy of the commons 
is useful as an abstract metaphor but is often misconstrued as unassailable truth; that all CPRs are 
destined for system collapse under communal ownership because of innately individualistic human 
behavior (Hardin 1968, Ostrom 1990; 22). Hardin implored for private or state ownership of CPR 
systems as the only viable tenure solutions to the commons dilemma. Uncritical acceptance of Hardin’s 
model ignored a 4th possibility; that individual’s could act collectively to use and maintain a resource 
system sustainably by devising and enforcing a set of rules (Ostrom 1990). Hardin failed to distinguish 
between the spectrum of outcomes including at one end an unmanaged open access commons and at 
the other a group of organized users who follow a set of rules to manage their resource system.   
Hardin’s work provided scientific support and naturalized logic for centralized management 
already institutionalized in much of the world’s forests by colonialism. Colonial administrations 
established organized forest departments throughout much of the world’s tropical forests staffed and 
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trained in the doctrine of European scientific forestry (Neumann 1997). Centralized management 
remained imbedded in forest department practice post-independence in most former colonies largely 
unchallenged up to present; subsequent generations of foresters continued to receive training in 
European universities and replicate the same practices (Hurst 2003).  
Despite lingering colonial influence and fear of the tragedy of the commons the mounting 
evidence of centralized forestry’s multiple failures opened space for alternative forest management 
paradigms. In recent decades alternatives to traditional forest management have become increasingly 
popular which encourage community involvement in aspects of forest use and decision-making. Many of 
these alternatives fall under the umbrella of participatory forest management (PFM). PFM encompasses 
various approaches to community involvement in forest management ranging from token participation 
to full decentralization (Wily 2000b). Decentralization is the most democratic form of PFM where forest 
tenure and management rights are transferred to community institutions. As opposed to other less 
democratic or compulsory forms of community engagement popularized in various community based 
natural resource management schemes decentralization marks a shift towards truly democratic 
processes. Distinct from other ad hoc forms of engagement decentralization strengthens local 
institutions by transferring legitimate power from center to periphery (Wily 2001). Community Based 
Forest Management (CBFM) is a common, highly decentralized form of PFM currently implemented and 
expanding in many countries. Another popular approach is Joint Forest Management (JFM), a partially 
decentralized regime where forest management rights are jointly shared between communities and the 
state. There is no consensus on whether partially decentralized programs such as JFM provide sufficient 
incentives and supporting institutional structure to improve governance and livelihood outcomes in 
practice. Some critics believe JFM is an insufficient transfer of powers too weak to deliver on the 
benefits of the democratic dividend (Ribot, Lund and Treue 2010).  
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Notwithstanding disagreement about the appropriate level of decentralized rights best suited to 
deliver on improved outcomes both CBFM and JFM have become increasingly popular; it is estimated 
that at least 10-12% of the world’s forests are under some form of decentralized management 
(Sunderlin et al. 2008, Ribot et al. 2010). Advocacy for forest sector decentralization is bolstered by its 
potential to deliver on a range of policy-relevant outcomes. The flow of enthusiasm and investment 
dollars into forest decentralization is fueled by the belief that community inclusion in democratic forms 
of management will improve forest conservation, local livelihoods and governance outcomes over the 
status quo state management (Larson, Barry and Ram Dahal 2010, Ribot 2002). Ensuring both secure 
and sufficient forest rights to communities is thought to structure the appropriate incentives for 
sustainable forest use while enabling good governance and improved access to needed forest resources 
supporting livelihoods (Ostrom 1990, Ribot 2004). By leveraging local institutions and internalizing the 
costs and benefits of management decentralization should improve the efficiency of forest management 
and distribute the benefits more equitably (Ribot 2002).   
Despite its rapid spread decentralization has failed to live up to unrealistic “panacea” 
expectations at solving CPR dilemmas (Ostrom 2007). In light of decentralizations imperfect empirical 
record questions are emerging as to whether it delivers on improved equity and efficiency outcomes in 
practice (Ostrom 2007). Many scholars critique the likelihood of parallel success across forest 
conservation, governance and livelihood outcomes (Persha, Agrawal and Chhatre 2011), while others 
raise concerns that decentralization may actually increase elite capture of resources exasperating 
existing inequalities rather than improving equity (Persha and Andersson 2014, Lund and Saito-Jensen 
2013). To evaluate these claims scholars have pursued a combination of in depth case studies and larger 
multi country analyses of PFM performance. Existing studies generally support a positive effect of 
decentralization on forest conservation outcomes (Pagdee et al. 2006, Hayes 2006) but there is less 
clarity around governance and livelihood outcomes (Jagger et al. 2014). It’s difficult to evaluate how 
8
 
 
decentralization alters the equity of governance and livelihood outcomes when only community level 
averages are considered as is the case in most existing quantitative studies. Therefore there is relative a 
gap in understanding how decentralization affects livelihoods and access to participation in governance 
institutions at the household level. 
Decentralization in Tanzania 
This study explores decentralized outcomes in the context of Tanzania’s rapidly decentralizing 
forest sector. Like many other countries, Tanzania adopted decentralization as a strategy to attain 
sustainable forest use, improve livelihoods and local governance for rural populations (Wily 2000a, Wily 
2002). Despite Tanzania’s relatively long history of forest sector decentralization it still lacks robust 
comparative studies of PFM performance (Wily 2002). Most existing studies consist of single or 
comparative case studies based on a handful of purposely selected sites which limits their external 
validity and ability to make causal claims. Therefore while sentiments abound that Tanzania is a “model 
for equitable forestry” (Wily 2001) this supposition is supported mostly by qualitative findings and very 
small sample sizes. Specifically there are no robust studies of governance and livelihood outcomes that 
dissect the distribution of benefits within communities focusing on issues of access and evaluating the 
equity of decentralized outcomes.  
Tanzania provides a useful context to further explore the effects of decentralization because of 
the co-occurrence of expanding CBFM processes alongside of existing state managed and JFM forests. 
The spatial co-occurrence of CBFM forests alongside JFM and state forests enables insight into how a 
highly decentralized forest management process may alter household level access to and participation in 
forest governance institutions and forest livelihood benefits. Forest patches or even continuous 
landscapes are often divided in a matrix of different tenure arrangements. Communities increasingly 
have access to more than one forest patch under different management regimes yet few existing studies 
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consider how this might shape forest related governance and livelihood outcomes at the household 
level. Several studies point to the potential for decentralized management to impart positive spillover 
effects (Vyamana 2009), but these cases are drawing from individual sites or very small sample sizes 
limiting the generalizability of their findings. Therefore the potential for democratic processes of forest 
management under CBFM to positively influence forest use and democratic participation beyond merely 
CBFM forests and institutions is a further unsubstantiated benefit attributed to decentralization. Yet the 
possibility of this positive interaction is important to understand as decentralization becomes 
increasingly popular. As the global shift away from exclusive state ownership of forests continues a 
better understanding of the substitution, interaction and spillover effects across different forest tenure 
arrangements is important for creating complimentary forest policies well positioned to achieve their 
supposed benefits (Jagger et al. 2014).  
Research Questions  
Using a mixed methods research design this study compares household level governance and 
livelihood outcomes under different decentralized arrangements in Tanzania. To do so households with 
access to forest reserves under centralized/state and JFM regimes are studied in comparison to those 
that additionally have CBFM processes underway in their villages. As a baseline I first examine the basic 
relationships between households’ wealth status and different measures of access and participation in 
forest livelihoods and governance. These measures include the estimated market value of two different 
fuel types harvested, the variety of forest products gathered, and the frequency of participation in forest 
harvesting, forest rule making and monitoring. Expanding on the initial relationships between wealth 
status and participation in each forest livelihood and governance construct I explore whether the 
additional presence of CBFM processes in a village changes household level outcomes. Specifically I ask;  
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1. How does household level wealth shape (1) access to and participation in forest governance 
institutions, and (2) access to forest resources?  
2. How does the co-occurrence of CBFM processes alongside centralized or JFM regimes within a 
village alter household access to institutions of forest governance and forest resources? 
3. Is there any relationship between governance and livelihood outcomes and presence of CBFM 
processes?  
Rather than searching for dichotomous outcomes of failure or success across decentralized 
programs this research aims to understand how access and related outcomes may differ for households 
within the same community.  This research will address how wealth status influences access to forest 
governance, resources and related livelihoods and how these outcomes change under different forest 
tenure arrangements. Unpacking the pathways between wealth status and access to forest livelihoods 
provides a useful lens to understand the role that more democratic forms of forest management and 
governance institutions can play in shaping outcomes in decentralized forest management. By focusing 
on how a household’s wealth status affects access to forest benefits and participation in governance 
institutions this research will help address whether these “pro-poor” forest policies are improving 
equitable access and outcomes around forest governance and livelihoods.  
This thesis is organized as follows; chapter two covers relevant theory and existing empirical 
literature on forest decentralization and access theory. Chapter three addresses the study area and 
context of decentralization in Tanzania. Chapter four discusses the data used for this study and chapter 
5 describes the analysis strategy and methods employed. Chapter six presents the results which are 
further discussed in chapter 7 and concluded in chapter 8 with discussion of the implications and 
limitations of this research.  
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CHAPTER 2. THEORY AND EXISTING LITERATURE 
Theoretical Frameworks 
A combination of formal property rights and informal processes shape access and determine the 
distribution of forest benefits within communities. To understand these processes this research draws 
upon existing theoretical work around the anticipated benefits of decentralization (Agrawal and Ribot 
1999, Ribot 2004) and the theory of access (Ribot and Peluso 2003) to consider the equity of governance 
and livelihood outcomes, their interrelationships and how they might be shaped under different forest 
management contexts. While the theory of access has been frequently employed under a political 
ecology framework and critique of environmental governance it has seldom been applied to rigorous 
empirical studies of decentralized forest outcomes. The intersection of these bodies of theoretical work 
help structure the hypothesized outcomes and subsequent interpretations of relationships between 
wealth and access to forest governance and livelihoods in this study. Drawing on these theories will help 
disentangle the processes and outcomes around forest governance and livelihoods under different 
forest management contexts. 
Decentralization is thought to improve forest conservation, governance and livelihoods by 
providing a better institutional fit over a centralized regime (Ribot 2002). Top down forms of 
management typically apply a one-size fits all approach insensitive to local context which can create 
inefficiencies in management and inequitable outcomes (Ostrom 1990). Operating through local 
institutions decentralization should engender efficiency and equity advantages over detached 
centralized management. Local governance can lower the operational costs of forest management and
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incorporate finer scale environmental and social information increasing efficiency and encourage 
equitable benefit sharing facilitated by good governance (Ribot 2004). Local users may be more efficient 
resource managers because of their localized time and place specific knowledge of the resource system 
and community of forest users (Ostrom 1990). By operating closer to the constituency of users’ local 
institutions of governance are presumed to exhibit tenants of “good governance” and be more 
accountable, transparent and responsive to local needs which is presumed to include more equitable 
distribution of benefits (Ribot 2002). These advantages are thought to emerge as positive externalities 
from democratic decision making processes (Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Ribot 2002).  Two main 
requirements are recognized for decentralization to deliver on these improvements; powers transferred 
must be both sufficient and downwardly accountable (Ribot 2002).  When both of these conditions are 
met more equitable and efficient outcomes are expected under decentralization (Smoke 2003). 
Therefore the functioning of local institutions of governance play a key role as linchpins in the expected 
chain of benefits and anticipated equity and efficiency dividends from decentralization. Important 
decisions about forest access and use are made in these spaces and knowledge generated which shape 
the distribution of forest benefits, ideally equitably, among households. 
By devolving rights to local communities decentralization is expected to improve forest 
governance making the resulting process more malleable and responsive to collective needs. Local 
institutions of government are more tangible and are therefore thought to be more transparent and 
accessible to the constituency of forest users (Van Laerhoven and Andersson 2013). Users can hold their 
locally elected officials more accountable through their vote and voice than they could a more powerful 
and removed forest department bureaucrat. With sufficient rights communities have the agency to 
create rules that permit appropriate access to immediate forest derived livelihood benefits that reflect 
the community’s equilibrium resource needs. When elected official are downwardly accountable to the 
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community and community members have access to participate in their local institutions of forest 
governance then more equitable outcomes should emerge (Ribot 2002).  
Evidence from the commons literature suggests that security of property rights over forest 
resources incentivizes sustainable management and decisions imparting coupled livelihood 
improvements and forest conservation (Ostrom 1990). Challenging the myth of spiraling overuse and 
inevitable tragedy of the commons secure property rights can create incentives to forego immediate 
resource consumption when users feel confident about the return of future benefits (Ostrom 1990). 
Therefor decentralization is hypothesized to engender good governance, access to livelihood benefits 
and create incentives for sustainable resource management through secure tenure (Ribot 2002). These 
outcomes are thought to be achieved in part by a more parsimonious management chain operating 
closer to actual forest resource and therefore with greater access to sensitive local and temporal 
information (van Laerhoven 2014).  
Moving from theory to implementation, the outcomes of decentralization depend in part on 
what rights are devolved to communities. Critical and comparative work evaluating the outcomes of 
community centered forestry initiatives have often failed to distinguish between the extensive range of 
CBNRM approaches and full decentralization (Ribot et al. 2010, Wily 2002). The former may engage any 
range of local actors in fleeting or even token participatory processes. By contrast decentralization 
permanently vests authority in local, downwardly accountable institutions (Ribot et al. 2010). Blurring 
tenuous CBRM participatory processes and full political decentralization has led to analytic imprecision 
in some existing work (Tacconi 2007, Ribot et al. 2010).  
Beyond this distinction it is further important to compare decentralized regimes by which types 
of rights are conferred to communities. While it’s commonly accepted that no one arrangement of rights 
is inherently sufficient for success in CPR management (Ostrom 1990), it’s important to unpack which 
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types of rights are transferred and their subsequent authority over resources prior to analysis of 
outcomes or judgements of relative success of any decentralized programs. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) 
provide a framework (see table 1) to disaggregate rights into mutually exclusive types. They distinguish 
between users’ rights of resource access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation in relation 
to the resource system. Under different decentralized contexts communities can hold different 
individual rights which collectively form an aggregate “bundle of rights” (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). 
Positions of authority are labeled corresponding to the different bundles of rights a community holds in 
Schlager and Ostrom’s typology which represent the different tiers of sovereignty communities’ wield. 
This framework allows for more careful evaluation of decentralization by disaggregating the diverse 
spectrum of resource related rights potentially transferred to communities. Further, how the individual 
bundles of rights array across different forest regime types hold implications around community power 
and outcomes. These differences in rights are used to generate hypothesis around how the presence of 
a more decentralized regime might shape outcomes. 
 
Bundles of Rights Associated with Users’ Positions of Authority 
Rights Full Owner Proprietor Authorized 
Claimant 
Authorized 
User 
Authorized 
Entrant 
Access X  X  X X X 
Withdrawal X  X  X X  
Management X X  X   
Exclusion X X    
Alienation X     
Table 1 Rights Framework. Source: Ostrom and Schlager (1996:133) 
Applying the typology of rights to decentralized forest management in Tanzania the differences 
between CBFM, JFM and state management in relation to community power become apparent (see 
table 2). Legally the president owns all non-private land in Tanzania preventing any community from 
holding rights of alienation, or right to sell their resource rights, over forests (Wily 2002). Despite this 
technical limitation communities hold rights of access, withdrawal, management and exclusion under 
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CBFM conferring sole forest proprietorship to the community.  Under JFM the same set of rights are 
conferred but are jointly shared between the community and a state actor. Therefor the authority the 
community is granted under JFM is not autonomous as it is under CBFM but requires co-determination 
and collaboration with the state. Under centralized/state management communities may have 
restricted rights of access or withdrawal depending on forest designation and the specific management 
plan devised. Often the forest rules are defined by the state actor and enforced by village government 
bodies (VEC/VNRC) (Treue et al. 2014). 
Forest Management Regimes and Rights Held by the Community in Tanzania 
Rights State JFM CBFM 
Access X (depends) X (co determined with state) X 
Withdrawal X (depends) X (co determined with state) X 
Management  X (co managed with state) X 
Exclusion  X (co determined with state) X 
Alienation    
Table 2 Regimes and Rights in Tanzania 
The typology provided by Schlager and Ostrom is a useful starting point to compare forest 
management regimes by the types of rights devolved to communities. However focusing solely on de 
jure property misses how rights might be coopted differently among users reproducing or extending 
existing intracommunity power disparities. Ribot and Peluso (2003) explore these processes further by 
extending the rights framework to explicitly include these informal processes that transform rights into 
powers. They draw the distinction between the Schlager and Ostrom’s concept of bundles of rights from 
their subsequent bundles of power; if rights are a result of rules then powers are the result of how rights 
and rules are employed (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Ribot and Peluso emphasize that despite equal legal 
claim to rights a combination of social and institutional processes mean these rights are often not 
equally accessible or applied in practice. Disentangling how rights are transformed into powers 
highlights the important concept of access. They contrast the definitions of property, the right to benefit 
from things, with access, the ability to derive benefits from things (Ribot and Peluso 2003). While these 
terms are often conflated and assumed to be equivalent Ribot and Peluso highlight that despite the 
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same property rights not all users have equal access i.e. opportunity to mobilize their rights to capture 
the full range of possible resource benefits from forests (Leach, Mearns and Scoones 1999). Therefor 
going beyond merely the legal property rights granted considering how preexisting social differences 
and institutions create or hinder access to forests differently among users is essential to evaluate the 
equity of forest management outcomes.  
Institutions of governance are one arena in which powers are derived from rights (Ribot and 
Peluso 2003). Processes of forest governance can reproduce existing power dynamics and further 
marginalize less powerful subgroups or serve as spaces for equitable distribution. If access to 
participation in institutions of forest governance is inequitable with disproportionate influence by the 
already powerful, then elites will disproportionately benefit from the powers created in forest 
management institutions. Elite domination can result in institutions which reflect elite preferences and 
serve elite interests. Command over the powers created in forest management institutions can be 
leveraged to increase capture of resource benefits (Van Laerhoven and Andersson 2013). Conversely, 
equitable institutions can provide opportunities for non-elites to articulate their unique resource 
preferences and influence outcomes (Van Laerhoven and Andersson 2013). While decentralization 
should create better fitting rules representative of local users’ equilibrium preferences it depends on 
each user’s ability to participate and influence the outcomes. If access is skewed then resulting rules will 
be tilted in favor of those participating in the process resulting in elite control of governance (Lund and 
Saito-Jensen 2013, Van Laerhoven and Andersson 2013). Wealth status can serve as an important 
indicator of elite status at the node of several overlapping strands of power derived from educational, 
cultural, and capital advantages (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Wealth status can therefor serve as a social 
leverage point creating differences in relative ability to access forest resources and participation in 
institutions of resource governance. The functioning and accessibility of institutions of governance are 
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important to consider when comparing decentralized outcomes because institutions can mediate the 
relationship between preexisting wealth status and access to needed forest resources.   
The existing literature presents a tension between decentralization theory which supports that 
good governance will improve livelihood outcomes and be more equitable than centralized regimes, and 
the possibility that decentralization increases opportunities to exasperate existing inequalities. How 
decentralization influences elite control of governance and elite capture of forest benefits is contested. 
While theory supports that decentralization creates more equitable governance and livelihood 
outcomes decentralization may also create access to new resources for elites to control. Elite capture of 
forests may merely be transferred downwards under decentralization from the forest department to 
local elites. Therefore, instead of creating more equitable outcomes decentralization could accelerate 
existing inequalities within communities by providing access to new opportunities to intensify existing 
power disparities (Persha and Andersson 2014). Lund and Saito-Jensen (2013) point out that processes 
of elite control over resource governance are often conflated with elite capture of resource benefits. 
Following on their work I look separately for evidence of elite control of governance, elite capture of 
forest resources and whether elite control is linked to elite capture and how the presence of CBFM 
processes might alter these pathways.  
Drawing on decentralization theory I predict that the presence of more democratic forest 
governance processes under CBFM will impart more equitable governance and livelihood outcomes for 
forest users. I predict CBFM will enable greater opportunities to participate in institutions of forest 
governance and harvest forest resources than more centralized state or JFM regimes. Further I 
anticipate these benefits to be more equitably distributed -- i.e., participation in forest governance 
processes and resources accessible even to poorer households. While I predict that wealth status will be 
positively related to forest use and participation in institutions of forest governance I believe this effect 
will be moderated by the presence of CBFM as its more democratic processes will enable equitable 
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access less dependent on preexisting wealth status. Therefor in sites with CBFM processes underway in 
addition to JFM or state forests I anticipate more equitable outcomes than sites with only JFM or state-
managed forests. The greater degree and autonomy of rights under CBFM should create more equitable 
access to participate in institutions of forest governance and improved access to livelihood benefits 
regardless of wealth status. As less democratic processes, institutions of forest governance under JFM 
and state regimes are anticipated to be less accessible to poorer households and elite wealth status 
more influential. Under the status quo state regime and JFM, which is jointly managed with state actors, 
I anticipate a stronger effect of wealth on participation in governance and capture of forest benefits. 
Further I predict that the influence of more democratic processes introduced through CBFM will have 
positive spillover effects onto household participation in JFM and state forest governance activities.  
Existing Literature 
The complex suite of factors that potentially influence forest management outcomes makes 
empirical evaluation of decentralization inherently challenging. However, a growing body of literature 
studying outcomes in different contexts has corroborated a set of influential factors related to success 
(Baland and Platteau 1996, Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Gibson, Williams and Ostrom 2005, Ostrom 1990, 
Agrawal 2001). These studies are contributing increasing clarity towards collective understanding of the 
mechanisms and outcomes emerging from decentralization. Within existing work there is growing 
consensus that decentralization is linked to improved forest conservation (Porter-Bolland et al. 2012, 
Pagdee et al. 2006) and governance outcomes (Andersson and van Laerhoven 2007, Bartley et al. 2008, 
Grindle 2004, Persha and Andersson 2014, Persha and Meshack 2015) but there is less clarity on 
livelihood outcomes (Jagger et al. 2014)  
Of the three policy objectives, forest conservation outcomes have received the most attention 
in forest decentralization literature. In a meta-analyses of existing case studies of community forestry 
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Pagdee et al. (2006) found that decentralized management improved forest conservation outcomes 
over state management. Common indicators linked to success included secure forest tenure, clear 
ownership, sanctioning and enforcement, and tangible livelihood benefits. While concrete livelihood 
benefits are emerging as a common indicator and important element of successful forest conservation 
(Pagdee et al. 2006), they are less studied and understood by comparison. One reason for the relative 
dearth of information on livelihood outcomes is they are inherently challenging to measure (Jagger 
2012, Angelsen et al. 2014). Studies of forest livelihood outcomes are particularly challenging to 
orchestrate data collection with large, random samples.  Due in part to these challenges many existing 
studies typically draw on a handful of purposefully selected sites limiting the external validity of their 
findings and interpretation of results to descriptive statistics and qualitative analyses. While these 
studies have aided in enriching the body of knowledge on key variables linked to processes and 
outcomes of forest sector decentralization they are limited in generalizability. There are an increasing 
number of quantitative studies of forest conservation, governance and livelihood outcomes moving 
towards empirical testing of key relationships identified by more qualitative work. However, most are 
still limited by problems of method and relatively small sample sizes (Agrawal 2001). Quantitative 
studies encompassing large sample sizes with multiple countries are less common with some notable 
exceptions (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006, Jagger et al. 2014, Persha et al. 2011). 
Within the existing body of work on the outcomes of forest sector decentralization in Tanzania 
much of the trends and limitations of empirical work on decentralization in general also hold true.  Only 
a handful of empirical studies exist which evaluate the outcomes of forest sector decentralization in 
Tanzania (Blomley et al. 2008, Lund and Treue 2008, Persha and Blomley 2009, Schreckenberger and 
Lutrell 2009, Vyamana 2009, Rantala and German 2013, Rantala et al. 2012, Treue et al. 2014). These 
studies address the impacts and outcomes of forest decentralization from different lenses contributing 
to the body of knowledge around forest decentralization outcomes in Tanzania. However all of these 
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studies are based on small numbers of purposely selected sites and small sample sizes for their various 
units of analysis (households, villages and forests). Many of these studies focus on performance of CBFM 
and or JFM on forest conservation outcomes (Persha and Blomley 2009, Blomley et al. 2008, Treue et al. 
2014). Persha and Blomley (2009) found a positive effect of CBFM on forest conservation attributed to 
stronger more effective institutions. Strong forest tenure and decision making autonomy ensured under 
CBFM proved important for forest conservation improvements which JFM lacked by comparison. 
However, the authors were not overly optimistic about the longevity of these programs without greater 
livelihood benefits. These findings point towards the need for further understanding of the outcomes 
and limitations of livelihoods access within different approaches to forest sector decentralization.  
Studies have also found differences in JFM performance and benefit distribution compared to 
CBFM. The costs of JFM implementation and enforcement borne by communities can be high relative to 
the benefits leading to lower levels of buy in and satisfaction (Ribot 2004). Individuals are believed to be 
more likely to create, monitor and enforce rules when they are engaged in the process and feel that the 
potential benefits of their effort outweigh the costs (Ostrom 1990). Persha and Blomley (2009) found 
tenuously successful CBFM sites in the Eastern Arc Mountains of Tanzania. The improved tenure and 
rights of management under CBFM seemed to provide sufficient incentives to improve forests and 
governance outcomes despite an unreliable flow of livelihood benefits. They found that JFM faced 
challenges emerging from power imbalances between community institutions and government forest 
officials. One serious challenge to the process in their study was forest officials tasked to implement JFM 
in collaboration with communities may harbor a conflict of interest where they benefited from 
involvement in illegal logging prior to JFM.  Therefor JFM may not only face inherent power imbalances 
in community-forest department partnerships but also be battling against the more powerful partners’ 
self-interest (Persha and Blomley 2009). Others criticize that JFM transfers the costs of management to 
communities without sufficient benefits (Vyamana 2009). Forest departments shed some of the costs of 
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monitoring and enforcing rules in JFM forests by passing them to community institutions. Yet 
community institutions are often not permitted to enact rules that would increase livelihood benefits 
commensurate with management costs. Similar mistrust and power disparities in the co-management 
dynamic have also been observed outside Tanzania (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006). Therefore existing 
work generally supports that livelihood benefits are often negligible under JFM and that the power 
“sharing” dynamic is prone to issues including inequity, lack of autonomy for communities and 
corruption.   
Existing work generally casts CBFM as outperforming JFM in Tanzania. Several case studies in 
Tanzania suggest that CBFM improves livelihood benefits over state managed forests, with less 
optimistic assessments of JFM (Lund and Treue 2008). Lund and Treue (2008) assess outcomes across all 
three objectives and find positive evidence of CBFM performance reducing logging but more ambiguous 
results across livelihood and governance outcomes. They found a mix of livelihood improvements when 
considering village level outcomes but also harmful restrictions borne particularly on the poorest, forest 
dependent households. The authors suggest that negative livelihood outcomes could be mediated 
through more accountable and equitable institutions of governance. The findings from this study would 
benefit from further empirical testing and a larger sample size; their study considered only one CBFM 
village and therefor the generalizability of their results is limited.  In the largest existing comparative 
study considering livelihood outcomes from nine villages across all regime types Vyamana (2009) found 
slight livelihood improvements under CBFM and JFM but indication of elite capture of forest benefits. 
Despite being one of the largest existing household level studies in Tanzania their study design restricted 
their analyses to descriptive comparisons limiting the interpretation of their results. These study design 
issues limit their ability to justify the underlying comparability of chosen study sites or their 
representativeness of their respective management regimes in general. Therefore the general optimism 
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around CBFM performance in Tanzania is built upon tenuous evidence in need if further empirical 
corroboration.  
Despite relatively positive tentative conclusions about the outcomes of CBFM relative to JFM 
and state forest management not all findings around CBFM are optimistic. Several case studies exist 
which compare livelihood and governance outcomes from CBFM across a few communities (Rantala et 
al. 2012, Rantala and German 2013, Lund and Treue 2008). Rantala and German (2013) and Rantala et 
al. (2012) studied livelihood and governance outcomes from CBFM in Tanzania and found issues of elite 
capture, corruption and insufficient livelihood benefits. Benefits from CBFM were marginal and unevenly 
distributed within communities. Limitations to CBFM were attributed to elite control of institutions of 
governance and corruption as processes shaping irregular benefit flow. These studies yield interesting 
insight into interrelated governance and livelihood outcomes but rely exclusively on descriptive, 
comparative analyses. Together these studies uncover important potential caveats of CBFM functioning 
in Tanzania that indicate CBFM may not be creating “pro-poor” equitable outcomes as policy intends 
and theory has predicted. The authors highlight the important limitations of linked elite control of 
governance and elite capture of resources, which can constrain access to the potential benefits of 
decentralization for the poor and other marginalized groups within communities. Further studies of 
issues of elite control and elite capture linked to decentralized outcomes are needed to further test the 
possible relationships and outcomes identified in these qualitative studies. Understanding of these 
processes and defensible determination of their outcomes in the context of Tanzania requires further 
exploration using rigorous statistical methods.  
Very few existing studies measure livelihood outcomes for JFM and state forests both with and 
without CBFM for comparison, and none that consider a relatively large, random sample of households 
distributed across forest management types. A few cases have witnessed that managing forest 
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commons at the village level revitalized existing institutions spreading to improvements across village 
level governance and management of surrounding forests (Alden Wily and Dewees 2001, Vyamana 
2009). Vyamana’s (2009) study found widespread improvements in governance that transcended merely 
the institutions of forest governance. Is appears possible then that the benefits of forest 
decentralization under CBFM could improve the governance and livelihood outcomes for households 
beyond the boundaries of the village forest reserve impacting how surrounding forests are managed. 
Vyamana’s findings are compelling but again rely on observations and descriptive statistics to support 
his conclusions. Few existing studies have explored the potential for interaction or spillover effects 
across different forest management types and none using robust statistical inference.   
Brockington (2007) points out that if decentralization’s success has not been well demonstrated 
then neither has its failure. Ultimately opinions abound ranging from decentralization as an utter 
success improving livelihoods and lessening inequalities to casting it as a complete failure riddled by 
poor implementation and elite capture. These propositions remain in the realm of conjecture or 
potentially isolated cases without sufficient supporting data. To deal with the complexity of possible 
variables this study benefits from the existing case study literature that identifies issues of equity and 
resource access which require further exploration. However, case studies lack the ability to link 
outcomes to explanatory variables (Agrawal 2001). Existing work largely consists of case studies rich in 
detail but limited in generalizability and multi country studies with large sample sizes able to make 
stronger causal claims but lacking supporting qualitative detail. This study leverages the accumulated 
knowledge provided by descriptive case studies and larger multi country studies but aims to bridge this 
gap combining the strength of quantitative and qualitative methods applied to the representative 
context of decentralized forest outcomes in Tanzania.   
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CHAPTER 3. STUDY AREA 
To explore these relationships Tanzania provides an excellent context because of its relatively 
long history of forest decentralization, representative forms of PFM and the relative dearth of empirical 
evaluation of decentralized outcomes (as discussed above). While decentralized forest management was 
underway in Nepal and India in the late 70’s and early 80’s, forest decentralization only gained 
popularity in Africa in the 1990’s (Wily 2001). Tanzania has one of the longest histories of 
decentralization on the continent and widest spread with at least 11% of the country’s forest area under 
some form of PFM (Blomley et al. 2008). It is estimated that PFM is now underway in 3.6 million ha of 
forest engaging over 1,800 villages (Blomley et al. 2008). A focus on Tanzania allows for comparison of 
two common forms of PFM; both JFM and CBFM in Tanzania are representative of approaches to 
decentralized forest management currently in place and expanding in many less developed countries 
(Jagger et al. 2014).  
Tanzania introduced PFM through a series of forest policy reforms and larger processes of 
democratic decentralization beginning in the late 1990’s. The National Forest Policy of 1998, Village 
Land Act of 1999 and the Forest Act of 2002 combined provide the vision and supporting legislation for 
decentralized forest management in Tanzania. Tanzania’s forest policy outlines three motivations for 
PFM:  i.) Improved forest quality from sustainable management; ii.) Improved livelihoods through access 
to needed forest products; and iii.) Improved governance through engagement with local institutions 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2003). Democratically elected village councils constitute the lowest tier of 
the governmental hierarchy to which forest management responsibilities are devolved. Leveraging 
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existing community institutions management decisions are entrusted to the Village Environmental 
Council (VEC), which is an existing committee in local government elected by the village general 
assembly.  
Under JFM’s co-management arrangement the community and forest department collaborate 
to manage an existing forest reserve. This process is not self-selecting by the villages themselves but top 
down driven by the government (Persha and Meshack 2015). JFM covers mostly montane forests at 
higher altitudes valued for their particularly high rates of biodiversity and crucial role in water 
catchment (Persha and Blomley 2009). Management responsibilities are shared between the community 
and the district forest office. Responsibilities include participating in and reporting on forest monitoring 
activities, meetings, and accounting. Management powers are vested with the Village Environmental 
Council (VEC) on behalf of and accountable to the community. JFM by decree includes greater 
restrictions on forest use, typically only granting rights to collect dead fuel wood and select non-timber 
forest products as well as rights to benefit from tourism and research activities (URT 2013). Therefore 
the role of the community and VEC in management under JFM falls on monitoring and enforcement 
rather than devising harvest rules. Any profits accrued through non-extractive activities such as research 
or ecotourism are typically split between the village and the forest department. The specifications and 
restrictions of JFM are laid out in the contractual joint management agreement (JMA) sign by the 
community and forest department (Blomley and Ramadhani 2006). Many JFM forests are gazetted but 
still in process towards gaining full legal recognition (Persha and Blomley 2009). 
 Under CBFM the community demarcates a village forest reserve (VFR) from forest on village 
land. The rights of access, use and exclusion are determined, monitored and enforced by the village 
through their elected VEC (Wily 2003). Therefor CBFM is a more decentralized form of PFM in Tanzania 
where the forest department only plays a supporting, advisory role (Wily 2000). Official establishment of 
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CBFM is typically facilitated with the help of local forest department or NGO’s to navigate the 
bureaucratic process (Rantala et al. 2012). Vested with management rights villages may decide to permit 
timber extraction and collect royalties along with enforce sanctions for rule violations and collect fines 
paid to the village council. To gain official recognition a VFR requires establishment of bylaws and a 
management plan for approval by the village general assembly and district council (URT 2007). However, 
most CBFM forests do not go through the full process of legal recognition but their de facto communal 
rights to forest use and management are supported by the Village Land Act of 1999 (Wily 2002). The 
remainder of forests considered here fall under centralized state management by the Tanzania Forest 
Service (formerly the Forestry and Beekeeping Division).  
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CHAPTER 4. DATA 
Study Design 
This MA thesis study utilizes a subset of data from a larger impact evaluation (IE) of JFM 
performance in Tanzania conducted during 2011-2015 by researchers at University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill together with the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (Persha and Meshack 2015). The 
impact evaluation covered 3,363 households from 110 villages and adjacent forest reserves under 
different forest management regimes in Tanzania. The full impact evaluation study of JFM’s outcomes 
across governance, livelihoods and forest conditions was structured as a quasi-experiment, in which 
sites with JFM management were randomly selected and then matched to comparable sites under 
centralized management, which serve as approximate control sites which are similar on relevant 
characteristics to JFM sites. Please refer to Persha and Meshack 2015 for full details of the broader JFM 
impact evaluation design, sampling and empirical strategies, and results of JFM impacts in Tanzania.   
Through the data collection process for the broader IE, a number of JFM and centralized sites 
sampled also had CBFM processes underway in the study villages, and for which the full set of 
household, village and forest data was also collected by the IE team. This study draws on a subset of 
data from Persha and Meshack 2015 to explore how the addition of CBFM in a village affects household 
level access to forest resources and participation in institutions of forest governance. To so do, data is 
drawn from a sub-set of sites from the larger IE study, representing all four forest management 
combinations that are currently possible in Tanzanian villages (see table 3). To generate a random 
sample of 12 cases for this thesis study, the full study site pool was first restricted to a band of similar 
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sites on the basis of the site’s propensity to be under JFM implementation (Persha and Meshack015), 
and then three cases per regime type were randomly selected. Persha and Meshack (2015) calculated 
the propensity scores from a set of village and forest level characteristics that were determined through 
their analyses to be determinants of where JFM is implemented in Tanzania relative to sites that remain 
centralized1.  In all the cases used for this MA thesis study, the CBFM process at each site was initiated 
after JFM. The twelve communities yield a sample of 349 surveyed households.    
 Sample Size for Household Surveys by Forest Management Type 
Forest Regime Type Household N Village N 
State 85 3 
JFM 90 3 
State + CBFM 86 3 
JFM + CBFM 88 3 
 349 12 
Table 3 Study Sample 
Data collection for the full IE study focused on evaluating the performance of JFM across 
ecological, social and institutional arenas. The study consisted of a set of research tools including 
household surveys, semi structured interviews with key members of forest governance institutions, 
focus groups with forest users, and randomized vegetation plots. The household level study drew on 
well-tested research protocols developed by the International Forestry and Institutions Research (IFRI) 
research program (www.ifriresearch.net) and CIFOR’s Poverty Environment Network (PEN). These 
longstanding research programs informed the development of a unique set of survey questionnaires 
specifically designed for the aims of the IE study. Questionaries’ focused on household forest livelihood 
activities and participation in governance in addition to basic socioeconomic and demographic 
information (Persha and Meshack 2015). Approximately 30 randomly selected households were 
sampled roughly evenly distributed across low, average and wealthy strata determined by a 
participatory exercise at each site (Persha and Meshack 2015). Interviews were conducted by 10 trained 
                                                          
1 For further detail on the larger study design and data please see the full report by Persha and Meshack 2015. 
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enumerators in Kiswahili with the household head covering a range of demographic and socioeconomic 
household level characteristics as well as information on household participation in aspects of forest 
governance and harvest.  
Data 
 For this MA thesis study a subset of the larger IE household questionnaire data set were utilized 
primarily focusing on questions related to household income, demographics, and participation in forest 
harvesting and governance. Additionally households’ open ended, categorical and ranking responses 
were included to better understand perceptions of the functioning and benefits attributed to each 
forest management type. Data were analyzed using the statistical software package STATA version 13.1. 
Descriptions of each variable from the questionnaire and how certain variables were constructed from 
the existing data proceeds organized by their function in the modeled relationships2.   
Independent Variables 
Two focal independent variables were used to approximate households’ wealth status; the 
natural log of per capita income (loginc) and an asset based wealth indicator (lowestquintile). Income is 
a ratio level variable constructed from the household survey; household’s self-reported annual income 
was divided by the number of household members yielding an annual per capita income in local 
currency (Tanzanian shillings) which was transformed to the natural log. This transformation makes a 
skewed distribution more compact and roughly normally distributed to enable statistical analyses. To 
address potential issues with endogeneity in statistical modeling an asset-based measure of household 
wealth status was also used as a construct of wealth status3. Using a measure of physical assets to 
capture wealth status is preferable to monetary income in models that include a measure of forest 
                                                          
2 For a full table of variable names and descriptions see appendix 
3 For further detail on how the asset based measure was constructed see Persha and Meshack 2015 
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income as the dependent variable to avoid correlation among variables within the model. The principal 
component scores from households’ assets were divided into quintiles and a dummy variable was 
created to capture the membership in the two poorest quintiles of households. The resulting 
dichotomous variable indicates the poorest households based on assets (0 nonmember or 1 member) as 
a construct of wealth status, which includes 44% of households in this sample (see table 4).  
The presence of community based forest management was included in all models. Presence of 
CBFM was applied site wide (all households in the same site have the same status) and coded as a 
dummy variable (0= JFM or state-managed forests only or 1= CBFM also present). 
Dependent Variables 
Dependent variables in this study include several different measures of households’ forest use 
and participation in institutions of forest governance. Forest use measures covered the variety of forest 
products a household gathers (prod2cats) and value of fuel wood (fuelwoodvalue) and charcoal 
harvested (charcoalvalue). The variety of forest products was measured as a recall of each distinct forest 
product gathered (as opposed to purchased) from the last month and ranged from 0 to 4 products in the 
data set. This was summed per household to capture a measure of the variety of forest products 
harvested per household, not a measure of volume or intensity of harvest. The variety of forest products 
were recoded into a dummy variable with those harvesting zero or just one forest product (equal to 0) 
and those harvesting greater than one product (equal to 1). The vast majority of households (75%) 
reported harvesting just one product, so this recode enabled testing for determinants of households 
which harvest a greater than average range of different forest products. As fuel wood was the most 
common forest resource collected it was isolated for further analyses. For comparison charcoal was also 
analyzed as a corollary to compare a low and high value fuel type. Households reported value of fuel 
wood and charcoal harvested from the last month’s activities were recorded in Tanzanian shillings. The 
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household surveys collected each individual’s estimated quantity harvested, their chosen unit of 
measurement, and estimated local market price per unit for both fuelwood and charcoal. The final 
variables were constructed by multiplying the quantity harvested, unit and price per unit to yield an 
estimated market value (in Tanzania shillings) harvested for fuelwood and charcoal per household. 
Average prices for each product were compared within each village to household’s responses and any 
responses missing prices were imputed using the village mean price per unit for each product. Each 
measure was transformed to the natural log as the distributions were highly skewed.  
Different household measures of participation in forest activities were also modeled as outcome 
variables. Household heads recorded their participation in forest harvest, monitoring and rule creation 
for their activities in their state or JFM forests. Households’ responses were recorded on a likert scale 
(never, rarely, sometimes, and often) in response to the question, “How often do you participate in each 
activity (harvest, monitoring, and rule creation)?” Their responses were recoded into dummy variables 
for those harvesting never/rarely (equal to 0) and sometimes/often (equal to 1). The resulting variables 
(harvestOther, monitorOther, createOther) have responses from the full set of 349 households.  
Variable Name Mean Std. err Min Max N 
loginc 11.65 0.08 2.34 15.61 349 
lowestquintiles 0.44 0.03 0 1 349 
anyCBFM 0.50 0.03 0 1 349 
prod2cats 0.25 0.02 0 1 349 
fuelwoodvalue 7.58 0.18 0 12.25 349 
charcoalvalue 1.00 0.16 0 13.86 349 
monitoringOther 0.09 0.02 0 1 349 
harvestOther 0.11 0.02 0 1 349 
createOther 0.04 0.01 0 1 349 
age 48.23 0.87 18 92 349 
education 5.00 0.18 0 13 349 
femaleheaded 0.15 0.02 0 1 349 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics Summary of Variables 
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Control Variables 
Other important household level characteristics measured include age and education of the 
household head (age, education) and if a household is headed by a single female (female headed). 
Household head’s age and years of education are self-reported in years. Whether or not a single female 
headed each household is coded as a dummy variable (0= male headed 1= female headed). Other 
controls considered including land and livestock owned shared a high degree of correlation with the 
different independent variables measuring wealth status so were left out of the models to avoid issues 
with collinearity among predictors. 
Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data came from answers to open ended question in the household level survey. 
Short responses from each survey were coded for common themes including perceptions of forest 
benefits, functioning of local governance, and issues of equity and access to forest resources. 
Households’ open-ended responses to questions included; 1) Explanation of forest benefits to the 
household 2). Explanation of perceptions of which group is most active in forest decision-making 3). 
Explanation of perceptions of which group benefits most from forest decision-making. Reponses were 
coded and for similar themes and are reported as categorical outcomes rather than the full open ended 
responses.  
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CHAPTER 5. METHODS 
This study employs a sequential mixed methods research design using statistical modeling and 
supporting qualitative analysis to explore possible pathways underlying quantitative relationships. First 
descriptive statistics and distributions for the different measures of households’ forest use and 
participation forest governance activities are compared organized by forest regime types and different 
measures of household wealth status. One-way ANOVA tests are used to compare means of two or 
more groups to see if they differ significantly from one another. The resulting F-test and statistics reveal 
whether the assumption that the groups share a common mean should be rejected at the chosen alpha 
level. This method is used to compare the averages for each independent variable across different 
categorical groupings including wealth status and forest regime type. ANOVA test results are reported 
including the F statistic, and p value4. Expanding upon these initial ANOVA tests the analysis proceeds 
utilizing a combination of ordinary least squares regression and logistic regression models.  
Models are used to better understand to what extent household wealth is associated with 
varying access to participation in 1). Institutions of forest governance and 2). Forest livelihood benefits 
and 3). Whether these relationships differ when CBFM is additionally present. Participation in forest rule 
making, monitoring and harvesting activities were studied to understand whether increasing wealth is 
associated with greater access to these forest institutions and benefits and if CBFM creates more 
equitable outcomes i.e. access less dependent on wealth. If poorer households have less access relative 
                                                          
4 Results of ANOVA tests are reported in the format of; between group degrees of freedom, within group degrees 
of freedom, F statistic, and p value.   
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to wealthier households holding other factors fixed this is treated as an indicator of inequitable access.  
Multivariate regression models expand upon the focal relationships to explore the partial effects 
of other relevant variables on each dependent variable and permit testing for interactions. In this study 
household wealth status is interacted with the presence of CBFM.  Interaction models are used to 
interpret whether CBFM has any equalizing effect -- i.e., whether CBFM affects the direction or the 
magnitude of any relationship between wealth status and participation in each forest activity. The 
extent to which CBFM alters any relationship between wealth status and participation is used to infer 
whether CBFM enables more equitable access. Further, the modeling approach also aims to illuminate 
potential spillover effects that CBFM has on non-CBFM forest activities. The effect of wealth and the 
presence of CBFM are modeled as predictors of governance participation and harvesting behavior in 
JFM or state-managed forests. This additional analysis is used to infer whether the presence of 
supposedly more democratic CBFM processes has any spillover effects on participation in institutions of 
governance and forest use in non-CBFM forests within the same village.  
All models are estimated with cluster robust standard errors clustered to account for the nested 
structure of the data (households sampled within villages). The assumption can be made that 
households within the same village will be more alike and potentially exhibit correlation in unobserved 
ways. Any correlation in unobserved variables among households within the same village violates the 
regression assumption that errors are independent and identically distributed. Without accounting for 
correlation of the errors OLS regression will typically underestimate standard errors and overestimate 
test statistics (Wooldridge 2012). One means of accounting for nested data is to cluster the standard 
errors at the highest level where there may be correlation (Pepper 2002). Using robust errors clustered 
at the village level adjusts the standard errors making them robust to unobserved correlation among 
individuals within the same village. This approach yields more reliable estimates of the standard errors, 
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which reflect the nested structure of the data. Future work could incorporate a multi-level modelling 
approach as another method for dealing with the nested structure of the data to account for both 
household level and village level effects. The OLS regression approach employed here is limited by 
problems of unobserved heterogeneity in the models errors, which could be correlated with household 
wealth status. Therefore differences in household wealth status may both be associated with changes in 
each outcome measure capturing forest use and also be associated with indirect changes in forest use 
through the errors. In future work a two stage least squares regression with instrumental variables is a 
potential approach to better address issues of endogeneity. This approach could test for an instrumental 
variable capturing wealth status which is correlated with direct household income but not correlated 
among the errors. Given that all observational data are subject to unobserved heterogeneity, OLS is 
assumed to be a sufficient modeling approach despite potential unobserved or omitted variable bias. 
However, the results are interpreted cautiously and limitations discussed further in the results chapter.  
Qualitative analysis is employed to aid interpretation of observed relationships among key 
variables derived from each model. Exploring the range and frequency of responses in sites with and 
without CBFM will provide further insight into any differences in the functioning of forest governance 
institutions and accessibility of forest benefits by regime. These data will be compared to the modeled 
outcomes to provide reinforcement or points of contrast with output results. The qualitative analysis 
provides additional information on how households perceive the functioning of their forest governance 
institutions and access to livelihood benefits and whether these outcomes are shaped by CBFM. 
Section 5.1  
Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
OLS regression models are used to test the effect of household’s wealth status on their harvest 
of two different fuel sources; fuelwood and charcoal. This approach allows for decomposition of how 
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household wealth status might impact the environmental income households’ harvest for fuel types 
with different relative values. The separate OLS models (see table 5) will tease out any effect of 
households’ wealth status on harvest of a low value fuel product (fuel wood) and a high value product 
(charcoal) and how each modeled focal relationship (regression of wealth status on fuelwood and 
charcoal) changes with the presence of CBFM in a village. Results are reported as marginally significant 
for test statistics between alpha .10 and .05, significant at p<.05, and highly significant p<.01.   
Ordinary Least Squares Models and Hypothesis  
Of the two fuel types I anticipate the market value of fuelwood households harvested to be less 
dependent on wealth status and the presence of CBFM. In the regression of low wealth status on the 
value of fuelwood harvested (OLS model1) I anticipate a positive effect of low household wealth status 
on fuel wood harvested. I anticipate poorer households to have a greater reliance on fuel wood, which is 
a lower value product than charcoal. I do not anticipate any significant effect of CBFM on fuel wood 
harvest or any significant interaction between CBFM and poverty on harvest (OLS model 2). This low 
value and abundant fuel source is typically accessible in all forests regardless of management type 
therefor I do not expect the presence of CBFM to impact the relationship. As a lower value product I do 
not expect fuel wood to be subject to significant issues of access and elite capture. By contrast charcoal 
is a more valuable product, which requires greater inputs for extraction and potential barriers (both 
social and punitive) to access. As a valuable forest product I anticipate poverty to be negatively related 
to the value of charcoal a household harvested. Charcoaling is typically a restricted activity in 
government and JFM forests yet wealthier households may be able to leverage their elite status or 
engage in rule breaking and gain access to this valuable product. CBFM permits villages to set their own 
guidelines around charcoaling and as a more democratic form of management should enable more 
equitable access to charcoaling for poorer households. Therefor in the model of poverty on charcoal 
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harvest (OLS model 3) I anticipate a negative focal relationship, CBFM to have a positive effect on 
charcoal harvest and a positive moderating effect (OLS model 4).  
Variables OLS Model 1 OLS Model 2 OLS Model 3  OLS Model 4  
Independent 
variable 
lowestquintiles lowestquintiles lowestquintiles lowestquintiles 
Dependent 
variable 
fuelvalue fuelvalue charcoalvalue charcoalvalue 
Regime type anyCBFM anyCBFM anyCBFM anyCBFM 
Moderator --- lowestquant*anyCBFM --- lowestquant*anyCBFM 
Controls age age age age 
 education education education education 
 femaleheaded femaleheaded femaleheaded femaleheaded 
Table 5 OLS Models 1-4 
Ordinary Least Squares Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables modeled with OLS regression were total value estimates for two forest 
products harvested; fuel wood and charcoal. Separate OLS bivariate models are used to capture the 
effect of wealth status on households’ estimated market value of fuel wood harvested (fuelwoodvalue), 
and the estimated market value of charcoal harvested (charcoalvalue). These variables were each 
transformed to the natural log which is a common and useful transformation for skewed variables5. 
OLS Independent Variable 
 The dummy variable for membership in the lowest asset based wealth quintiles 
(lowestquintiles) is used as the independent variable in all OLS models to capture household wealth 
status. This approach compares differences in the value harvested for each forest product across the 
poorest and wealthiest households. To deal with potential endogeneity in these models the wealth 
quintiles derived from households’ assets are used as a proxy for wealth status instead of the log of 
income to avoid using a measure of monetary income for both independent and dependent variables. 
                                                          
5 The interpretation of log-level regression coefficients for each xi is interpreted as %Δy=100⋅β1⋅Δxi 
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This measure was considered more robust to endogeneity because physical assets are not as directly 
related to forest derived income as a direct liquid asset measure such as reported income. Therefore the 
asset-based measure of wealth status is less prone to problems with reverse causality brought about by 
using two income-based measures.      
Ordinary Least Squares Moderator 
Each bivariate model is elaborated upon to include a dummy variable for presence of CBFM and 
for any moderating effect of CBFM. The dummy variable for presence of CBFM (anyCBFM) is included to 
reveal the partial effect of CBFM on the value harvested for each product net of other predictors. 
Adding forest regime to the models as a dummy regressor illustrates any differences in intercepts for 
each regression line (outcomes for JFM and centralized management with and without CBFM). The 
coefficient for the regime dummy reveals if households in CBFM sites are associated with distinct levels 
of harvest (for each fuel product) holding wealth status and other controls fixed. Any difference in the 
intercepts is the mean difference in value harvested with the addition of CBFM holding other covariates 
constant. To test for moderation an interaction term between membership in the lowest wealth 
quintiles and presence of CBFM (lowestquintiles*anyCBFM) is added to each model. Moderation reveals 
whether the effect of wealth status (IV) on the different measures of fuel products harvested (each DV) 
depends on the value of a third variable (Z), in this case the presence of CBFM.  
Ordinary Least Squares Controls 
In order to elucidate the effect of wealth net of potential confounding covariates certain 
household level characteristics were controlled for including age, years of education, and whether or 
not the household is female headed (age, education, femaleheaded). These characteristics are 
controlled for because they are related to both the independent and dependent variables; they are 
causally prior to wealth status and known to influence aspects of forest harvest. Households that are 
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older, less educated or female headed are anticipated to participate less in forest governance 
institutions and harvest activities. Other household level controls were considered including land 
holding, large livestock and small livestock owned but were not included due to issues with 
multicollinearity introduced into the models due to overlap in these measure and the different 
measures of household wealth status. The larger IE study accounted for different forest and community 
level factors related to the administrative selection bias for JFM in the study design using a principal 
component analysis to compare sites with similar scores or propensity for JFM implementation. The 
subset of sites for this thesis study were drawn randomly within each forest regime after first restricting 
the sample to those with similar principal component scores (as described in the study design section). 
Therefore the villages from which this study is drawn are alike on average across the range of covariates 
known to bias JFM site selection such as forest size and type, community population, and distance to 
markets, among others6.  
Section 5.2  
Logistic Regression 
Logistic regression models were used to determine the influence of wealth status and regime 
type on binary measures capturing household participation in different aspects of forest harvest and 
institutions of governance. Following on the analysis of market value harvested for two specific forest 
products (fuelwood and charcoal) logistic regression is used to further explore how wealth and regime 
are related to participation in different aspects of forest harvesting and institutions of governance. The 
variety of forest products a household gathered (binary capturing those harvesting greater than one 
product) is modeled to explore whether wealth status and the presence of CBFM are associated with a 
greater likelihood of harvesting more than one forest product. Additionally an interaction model is used 
                                                          
6 All processes motivating the selection of control variables described here apply to all subsequent models. 
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to test whether CBFM has any moderating effect on the relationship between wealth and likelihood of 
harvesting a greater variety of forest products. Further logistic modeling is also used to identify any 
spillover effects related to the presence of CBFM. To do so the dummy variable for presence of CBFM is 
added as a predictor of household participation in forest harvest, monitoring and rule creation in JFM 
and state-managed forests and institutions. This will reveal whether the presence of CBFM processes in 
a village is related to any differences in a household’s participation in aspects of their JFM and state-
managed forests and institutions of governance. In logistic regression the interpretation of coefficients 
becomes the effect of each predictor on the log odds of the outcome modeled as a linear combination 
of the predictor variables. Log odds are reported as odds ratios and predicted probabilities to aid 
interpretation of key relationships. Results are reported as marginally significant for test statistics 
between alpha .10 and .05, significant at p<.05, and highly significant p<.01.   
Logistic Regression Models and Hypothesis  
I anticipate a greater diversity of forest products to typically incorporate higher value forest 
products and therefor expect a positive relationship between income and the likelihood of harvesting 
greater than one forest product (see Table 6 for logistic regression model 5 and 6). I anticipate CBFM to 
have a positive marginal effect on the variety of products gathered and mitigate the positive affect of 
income on the likelihood of harvesting greater than one product.  
Variety of Forest Products 
Variables 
Model 5 Model 6  
Independent variable loginc loginc  
Dependent variable prod2cats prod2cats  
Regime type anyCBFM anyCBFM  
Moderator --- loginc*anyCBFM  
Controls age age  
 education education  
 femaleheaded femaleheaded  
Table 6 Logistic Regression Variety of Forest Products Harvested 
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 To understand how wealth and CBFM affects participation in monitoring, rule creation and 
frequency of harvest in state and JFM forests logistic regression models were run (see table 7). I 
hypothesize that wealth will have a positive effect on each measure of forest use and participation in 
institutions of forest governance under state and JFM regimes. I anticipate CBFM to have a positive 
spillover effect increasing the likelihood that a household participates in each activity.  
 
Models of 
participation 
in JFM and 
state forests 
 
 
 
Variables  
 
 
 
Model 7 
 
 
 
Model 8 
 
 
 
Model 9 
 Independent variable loginc loginc loginc 
 Dependent variable createOther monitorOther harvestOther 
 Regime type anyCBFM anyCBFM anyCBFM 
 Controls age age age 
  education education education 
  femaleheaded femaleheaded femaleheaded 
Table 7 Logistic Regression Models of Participation in Forest Rule Creation, Monitoring and Harvest 
Logistic Regression Dependent Variables 
Four aspects of forest participation were modeled with logistic regression; the variety of forest 
products gathered, participation in rule creation, monitoring, and frequency of forest harvesting. 
The variety of forest products a household gathered was grouped into those harvesting zero or 
just one forest product (equal to 0) and those harvesting greater than one product (equal to 1). Since 
the majority of households reported gathering just one product (and that product was almost always 
firewood) this recode enabled testing of whether wealth and presence of CBFM increase the likelihood 
of gathering a greater variety of forest products, which are also typically higher value forest products.   
Households’ responses to their participation in JFM and state forest governance institutions and 
forest use were categorized into dichotomous average and above average participation for each 
outcome. This categorization enabled closer attention to what factors distinguish households which are 
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unique in their involvement in forest governance and use, particularly whether wealth and CBFM are 
influential. Responses across these ordinal scale variables were disproportionately clustered on lower 
ends of participation (never/rarely participating). These variables were regrouped into binary variables 
capturing those who never/rarely participate (equal to 0) and sometimes/often participate (equal to 1) 
for each activity (rule creation, monitoring, and forest harvest) and parsed into activities reported in 
state/JFM forests and CBFM forests.  
The dummy variable for presence of CBFM (anyCBFM=0 or 1) and an interaction term between 
CBFM and income are also included (inc*CBFM). 
Logistic Regression Independent Variables 
The log of income (loginc) is the predictor representing household wealth status in all logistic 
regression models.   
Logistic Regression Controls 
Household level characteristics controlled for included age, years of education, and whether or 
not the household is female headed (age, education, femaleheaded) in all models.  Similar to the 
elaboration of the OLS models adding these controls to the model holds their effect on the outcomes 
constant to isolate the effect of wealth and regime on participation in forest use and governance regime 
net of these potential confounders. Future extensions of this work will include further controls capturing 
the importance of forest income to the household and satisfaction with VEC/VNRC as additional controls 
related to household participation.  
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Section 5.3  
Qualitative Analysis 
Qualitative analysis of open ended survey questions is guided by a set of codes. The codes are 
designed to group information from the supporting text and provide theoretical basis for further 
interpretation of the focal and elaborated relationships in this study. Specifically the qualitative analysis 
is employed to understand the means by which key predictors are influencing household participation in 
forest governance and forest use under different forest regime types and specifically how the additional 
presence of CFM affects; activities within CBFM forests and institutions of governance and if there are 
any spillover effects to activities into state or JFM activities. Codes grouped responses that signified 
issues around access and perceived barriers to participation in governance and access to forest 
resources. The qualitative analysis is designed to provide a better understanding of whether CBFM 
appears to be more equitable than state or JFM arrangements and whether more democratic 
governance might be linked to any improved outcomes. Further the qualitative data is coded for any 
indication of spillover effects i.e. positive outcomes around equity and access in JFM or state activities 
linked to presence of CBFM. Households’ description of forest benefits derived from each forest regime 
were condensed and coded from open ended responses to like categories. For example common 
benefits such as “rain, shade, clean water, protection of soil,” were coded as environmental services. 
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CHAPTER 6. RESULTS 
Section 6.1  
Forest Livelihood Outcomes; Relationships between Wealth Status and Decentralized Management on 
Household Harvest of Fuelwood and Charcoal 
 Comparing the mean values harvested for both fuelwood and charcoal by household wealth 
status (see fig. 1) there appear to be wealth based differences in access to forest derived fuel sources7. 
While the average value harvested for both fuel types are greater for wealthier households this gap is 
steeper for charcoal (a difference of TSH 10,645 or about USD 5.30). Charcoal is typically considered a 
more desirable, value added product compared to fuelwood with a greater average market value. 
Wealthier households in this study harvested a greater average value of charcoal (the higher value fuel 
product) relative to fuelwood. A one-way ANOVA test confirmed the averages for fuelwood and charcoal 
for the wealthiest households were statistically different (F(14,180)=7.9 p=.0). By contrast poorer 
households reported harvesting a greater average value of fuelwood than charcoal (difference of TSH 
4,895 or USD 2.63). However for the poorest households the difference between average charcoal and 
fuelwood harvest were not statistically significant (F(7,146)=.40 p=0.90). The difference in mean 
fuelwood harvest by wealth status was marginally significant (F(1, 347)=3.66 p=.06) with wealthier 
households reporting a greater average harvest of fuelwood. However the apparent difference in 
charcoal harvest by wealth status was not statistically significant (F(1, 347)=1.88 p=.17). Therefore 
wealthier households attained greater environmental income from charcoal, the higher value fuel 
                                                          
7 This comparison is made using the asset based measure of household wealth described in the data section to 
mitigate issues with endogeneity in concept and subsequent modelling. Poorest households represents those in 
the bottom two quintiles of assets.  
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source, relative to fuelwood. Wealthier households also reported a greater average value of fuelwood 
harvested compared to poorer households.   
 
Figure 1 Fuel Types and Wealth Status 
Disaggregating these relationships further differences in average fuelwood and charcoal harvest 
are compared by forest management type (see fig. 2). Comparing the average harvest for each fuel type 
by regime reveals some potential differences in harvesting opportunities related to forest management 
context. The mean value of fuelwood harvested across all possible regime combinations did not display 
much variation ranging from a low of TSH 9,640 under JFM to TSH 11,445 in sites with state forest 
management and CBFM processes underway. Further, the slight differences across group means were 
not statistically significant as determined by the one-way ANOVA test (F(3, 345)=0.15 p=.93).  As a lower 
value product and one that is largely unregulated regardless of regime type this relatively consistent 
average was expected. By contrast the mean value of charcoal harvested by regime shows greater 
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variation. The average value of charcoal harvested was very low in sites with only state or JFM forest 
management (TSH 558 and TSH 561 respectively). Average charcoal harvest was greater in sites where 
CBFM was additionally present; households in sites with state and CBFM forests reported an average of 
TSH 13,366 charcoal harvested and TSH 22,676 in JFM sites with CBFM. However the one-way ANOVA 
test indicated these differences were just outside the bounds of statistical significance at the alpha .1 
level (F(3,345)=1.98 p=.12).  
 
Figure 2 Fuel Types Harvested by Management Regime
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 The initial relationships between household wealth status and fuel harvest (fig. 1), and 
management regimes and harvest (fig. 2) are further explored to see whether the intersection of wealth 
status and forest management regime are related to differences in harvest of fuelwood or charcoal (see 
fig.3). This comparison investigates the potential for an interactive effect of wealth status and presence 
of CBFM processes on each measure. To do so average harvest for both fuelwood and charcoal are 
compared for the poorest and wealthiest households in sites with only state and JFM management to 
those which additionally have CBFM processes underway. The average value of fuelwood that a 
household harvests appears largely unaffected by household wealth status in sites with only state or 
JFM forests; the one-way ANOVA test confirmed that the difference in average fuelwood harvest for the 
poorest and wealthiest households was not statistically significant (F(1,173)=0.02 p=.88). However, the 
difference in average fuelwood harvest by household wealth status was significant where CBFM was 
additionally present; the wealthiest households reported a greater average value of fuelwood collected 
in sites with CBFM underway (F(1,172)=4.05 p=.05). Comparing the value of charcoal harvested in sites 
with only state or JFM forests there is no apparent difference across wealth groups (F(1,173)=.85 p=.36). 
Overall the average charcoal harvested is very low in sites without CBFM regardless of household wealth 
status. Where CBFM was also present the difference in the average value of charcoal harvested by 
wealth status appears large (TSH 19,283 or about USD 9.65) with wealthier households harvesting more. 
However, the one-way ANOVA test revealed this difference was not statistically significant 
(F(1,172)=1.53 p=.21). While descriptive comparison points to a potential interaction effect between 
wealth status and presence of CBFM processes on charcoal harvest (with a substantial gain in charcoal 
harvest under CBFM especially for the wealthiest households), these differences were not statistically 
significant at even the p<.1 level.  
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Figure 3 Fuel Types, Household Wealth Status and Presence of CBFM 
Forest Livelihood Outcomes; Exploring Determinants of Households’ Fuelwood and Charcoal Harvest 
with Ordinary Least Squares Regression  
Expanding beyond the descriptive comparisons of fuel wood and charcoal harvest OLS 
regression was used to test for any significant effects of wealth status and CBFM on the market value of 
each fuel type harvested and for any moderating effect of CBFM on the focal relationship (see table 8). 
The regression results for the models of fuel wood harvest (models 1 and 2) revealed no significant 
relationships with wealth status, presence of CBFM or any interaction between wealth status and CBFM 
on households’ harvest. The only regression model that revealed any significant result is the negative 
effect of being in the poorest asset based wealth group on the harvest of charcoal. The effect of being 
among the poorest households (lowestquintiles=1) is associated with a 47.6% decrease in the value of 
charcoal harvested which is statistically significant at the p<.01 level. While the descriptive comparisons 
indicated differences across theses fuel types by wealth status and regime type these relationships did 
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not prove to be statistically different from zero at even the p<.1 significance level. This indicates that 
household wealth status (based on household assets) is not significantly related to any difference in the 
average value of fuel wood harvested. By comparison being among the poorest households reduces the 
expected market value of charcoal harvested by about half. There is no significant effect of the presence 
of CBFM in a village on the value of either fuel type harvested nor any conditional effect of CBFM. The 
model fit for all regression models were low. In the model of charcoal harvest with the significant effect 
of wealth status (model 3) the predictors explained 7.2% of the variation in the value of charcoal 
harvested. The model was post checked for heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity and neither test 
revealed violation of regression assumptions8.    
OLS Regression Outputs Fuel wood Charcoal     
 Fuel types m1 m2 m3 m4 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
lowestquintiles -0.559 -0.666 -0.646** -0.315 
 (0.385) (0.49) (0.206) (0.245) 
anyCBFM -0.515 -0.614 0.951 1.253 
 (0.603) (0.388) (0.645) (0.759) 
Female headed 0.355 0.352 0.058 0.066 
 (0.546) (0.544) (0.433) (0.409) 
Education 0.031 0.032 0.107 0.104 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.056) (0.058) 
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) 
lowestquintiles*anyCBFM           ---     0.222 --- -0.682 
           ---     (.812) --- (0.41) 
Constant 7.966** 7.995**   0.940** 0.85** 
 (0.768) (0.698) (0.675) (0.626) 
R2 0.01 0.01 .072 .075 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<.01     
Table 8 OLS Fuel Type Outputs 
                                                          
8 After running cluster robust standard errors the residuals were examined and plotted against the dependent 
variable for constant variance. Variance inflation scores were checked for all regressors and all VIF< 1.3. 
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The combined results of the fuel type harvest analysis indicate that fuel type harvest is not 
significantly affected by the presence of CBFM on household level outcomes and that any wealth effect 
is not conditional on CBFM for either fuelwood or charcoal. The average value of charcoal harvested is 
about 47% greater for wealthier households but is not significantly affected by the presence of CBFM in 
a village. Overall the fit of these models was very low indicating that the explained variance in the value 
of each fuel harvested was largely unexplained by the modeled predictors. These results are limited by 
the relatively large standard errors for both measures. The instability of these estimates make 
conclusive and statistically significant model results unlikely.  
Section 6.2  
Forest Livelihood Outcomes; Relationships between Household Wealth Status, Forest Management 
and Variety of Forest Products Harvested 
 Expanding from the comparison of two specific forest products (fuelwood and charcoal) I further 
explore potential differences in household forest livelihood outcomes using a measure of the variety of 
forest products a household harvested. Comparing fuelwood and charcoal enabled insight into potential 
the effects of wealth status and management regime on households’ access to both a low and high 
value forest derived fuel source. Utilizing the variety of forest products gathered as an independent 
variable captures a range of other potential forest resources (not just fuels) households might harvest 
and whether wealth status and forest management type shape access to these resources.  
Comparing the mean variety of forest products gathered by household income (quartiles of 
logged per capita income) and presence of CBFM some potential differences in household access to 
forest products become apparent (see figure 4). Where CBFM is present the data point to a steady 
increase in the average variety of forest products households gathered by income. The poorest 
households appear to gather a similar variety of products regardless of CBFM, but the patterns across 
regime types diverge at higher levels of income. Households in the highest income quartile in sites 
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without the additional CBFM processes (i.e. villages that only have either JFM or centralized 
management) gathered a greater variety of products on average compared to sites that do have CBFM 
underway. Differences in the average variety of products gathered by income quartiles were significant 
for households with only JFM or state forests (F(3,171)=8.49, p=.00) and differences by income were 
also significant where CBFM was additionally present F(3,170)=2.61 p=.05). A further one-way ANOVA 
test confirmed that the difference in between the average variety of forest products gathered for the 
wealthiest quartile in centralized/JFM compared to sites which also have CBFM was significant 
(F(1,87)=5.24, p=.02) with the wealthiest households gathering a greater variety in sites without CBFM 
underway.   
 
Figure 4 Variety of Forest Products Gathered by Income Quartiles and CBFM 
Comparing the proportion of households gathering greater than one forest product by income 
quartiles and forest management regime the apparent difference for the wealthiest households persists 
(see fig. 5). Differences in the average proportion of households gathering greater than one forest 
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product by income are statistically significant for sites with only JFM or state-managed forests 
(F(3,171)=10.32, p=.00) as well as those which additionally have CBFM processes underway 
(F(3,170)=2.44 p=.07).  In sites with only JFM state managed-forests 56% of households in the highest 
income quartile harvest more than one forest product compared to only 36.5% where CBFM is also 
present. While there is still a relationship between increasing wealth and the proportion of households 
gathering a greater variety of forest products regardless of forest management type, the gap for the 
wealthiest households in sites with only JFM or state-managed forests appears greater. The difference in 
the proportion of the wealthiest households gathering more forest products in JFM or state-managed 
forests compared to those where CBFM was present proved to be statistically significant in a one-way 
ANOVA test (F(1,87)=3.64, p=.06). Across lower and moderate levels of income there appear to be no 
differences in the proportion of households harvesting a greater variety of forest products regardless of 
the presence of  CBFM in a village. One-way ANOVA tests for all other income quartiles were not 
significant9. Therefore access to a greater variety of forest products was related to income but the 
presence of CBFM processes was not significantly related to differences in access except potentially for 
                                                          
9 ANOVA results log income=1 (F(1,86)=.33, p=.56), ANOVA results log income=2 (F(1,85)=.13, p=.72), 
 ANOVA results log income=3 (F(1,84)=.23, p=.63) 
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the wealthiest households. presence of CBFM processes was not significantly related to differences in 
access except potentially for the wealthiest households. 
  
Figure 5 Proportion of Households Gathering >1 Forest Products by Logged Income Quartiles and CBFM 
Forest Livelihood Outcomes; Exploring Determinants of Household Access to a Variety of Forest 
Products with Logistic Regression  
The relationships between wealth status and forest regime were investigated further through 
logistic regression to better understand what factors influence the likelihood a household harvests a 
greater variety of forest products. The results from model 5 indicate that the likelihood a household 
harvests greater than one forest product is influenced by income and age of the household head (see 
table 9). As predicted there is a positive effect of income on the odds of harvesting greater than one 
forest product. For every one unit increase in the log of income there is an 56% increase in the odds of 
harvesting greater than one forest product (odds ratio of 1.563) which is statistically significant at the 
p<.01 level. Age has a small negative effect on the odds of harvesting greater than one product. For 
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every additional year in age of the household head the households odds of harvesting greater than one 
product decrease by 1.5% (odds ratio of .985) which is significant at the p<.05 level. The partial effect of 
CBFM on the likelihood of harvesting greater than one product was just outside of the statistical 
significance bounds set (p<.104) and is therefore not interpreted as statistically different from 0. The 
constant represents the odds ratio for a household with a log income of 0 holding the other predictors 
constant (state or JFM forest, not female headed, 0 education 0 age).  
Logit Models Model 5                          Model 6                   
>1 Variety of Forest Products b/se Odds ratio b/se   Odds ratio 
Log income     0.447**      1.563**     0.601**     1.825** 
     (0.088)  (0.138) (0.091)  (0.167) 
anyCBFM  -0.399 0.671   3.347 28.424 
 (0.492) (0.33) (2.062) (58.604) 
Female headed -0.429 0.651 -0.385 0.681 
 (0.384) (0.25) (0.387) (0.263) 
Education   0.068 1.07   0.065 1.067 
 (0.056) (0.06) (0.056) (0.06) 
Age -0.015* 0.985* -0.014*  0.986*  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log income*anyCBFM       ---               --- -0.311*  0.733*  
       --- ---  (0.147) (0.108) 
Constant 5.815** 0.003** 7.654** 0.000** 
 (1.295) (0.004)  (1.492) (0.001) 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<.01         
Table 9 Logistic Regression Results on Harvesting >1 Forest Product 
Elaborating upon this relationship model 6 includes the marginal effect of having an additional 
CBFM process in the village on the odds of a household harvesting greater than one forest product. The 
odds ratio coefficient for income indicates that for a one unit increase in the log of income there is a 
82.5% increase in the odds of harvesting greater than 1 forest product (odds ratio of 1.825) for 
households with only state or JFM management processes (significant at the p<.01 level). Comparatively 
the effect of a one unit increase in the log of income in CBFM increases the odds of harvesting greater 
than one product by only 33% (odds ratio of 1.33). There is a 50% reduction in the effect of income on 
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the odds of harvesting greater than one product for households in villages with CBFM compared to 
those with only state or JFM forests. The marginal effect of CBFM on the likelihood of harvesting greater 
than one product at different levels of predicted income can be seen in the marginal effects table and 
plot (see table 10 and fig.6). The marginal effects of CBFM on the likelihood of harvesting a greater 
variety of products at different levels of income reveals that this interaction is only statistically 
significant at higher levels of income. As the marginal effect of CBFM scales with income it becomes 
statistically different from 0 as income is greater than or equal to 14 on the log scale. While this effect is 
statistically significant, only 7.25% of households (n=25) in the sample had logged per capita incomes 
greater than or equal to 14. Therefor this effect is interpreted cautiously. Age also has a significant effect 
in model 6 slightly reducing the odds of harvesting more forest products. For every additional year in 
age for a household in state or JFM forests there is a .986 change in the odds ratio, or about a 1.4% 
reduction in the odds of harvesting greater than one product. The constant indicates the odds ratio of 
harvesting greater than one product for a hypothetical household with an income of 0 in state or JFM 
forests holding all other controls at 0.    
AME 
Model 6 
Log Income dy/dx 
        
SE     P 
8 .0484 .0612 0.429 
9 .0443 .0694 0.523 
10 .0267 .0785 0.734 
11 -.0112 .0883 0.899 
12 -.0731 .0973 0.452  
13 -.1536 .1028 0.135 
14 -.2362 .1028 0.022* 
15 -.3011 .0983 0.002** 
+ p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<.01 
Table 10 Average Marginal Effect of CBFM on Harvesting Greater than 1 Forest Product at Different Levels of Income 
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Figure 6 Average Marginal Effect of CBFM  
This relationship is plotted at predicted margins for households in state and JFM forests 
compared to those with CBFM present in figure 7. Again, the predicted probability of harvesting greater 
than one forest product does not vary with CBFM at most levels of income. However, the predicted 
probability of harvest diverges at the highest levels of income between households with only state or 
JFM managed forests and those where CBFM is also present. Overall this indicates that there is no 
statistically significant marginal effect of CBFM on the likelihood of harvesting more forest products at 
most levels of income. However, the divergence for the wealthiest households indicates that the 
presence of CBFM processes may affect the probability of accessing a greater variety of forest products 
for elites. The reduction in the effect of income on the odds of harvest for the wealthiest households 
under CBFM is tentative indication of an equalizing effect of CBFM; access to a greater variety of 
products may be more equitable i.e. less dependent on wealth status when CBFM processes are present 
in a village. However given the relatively small proportion of households with log income >14 this effect 
is interpreted cautiously.  
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Figure 7 Predicted Margins Probability of Harvesting  
Section 6.3  
Forest Governance and Forest Harvest Outcomes; Exploring Determinants of Household Participation 
in Different Institutions of Forest Governance through Logistic Regression   
 Logistic regression was used to model the effect of wealth status and CBFM on participation in 
different institutions of forest governance and forest harvesting in state and JFM forests (see table 11). 
Wealth status had a significant effect on the likelihood of participating in forest monitoring and harvest. 
In the model of income on the likelihood of participating in forest monitoring (model 7) there was a 
positive and significant effect. For every one unit increase in log income the odds of participating in 
forest monitoring increased by 45% (odds ratio of 1.45) which was significant at the p<.01 level. The age 
of the household head also affected the likelihood of participation; for every year in age the odds of 
participating increase by 4.7% which was significant at the p<.05 level. There was no significant effect of 
having an additional CBFM process in the village on a household participation in forest monitoring 
activities in state or JFM forests. This indicates that household wealth is related to higher participation in 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
H
a
rv
e
s
ti
n
g
 >
1
 F
o
re
s
t 
P
ro
d
u
c
t
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Log income
State or JFM CBFM
Predictive Margins and CBFM Status
58
 
 
forest monitoring in state and JFM forests, and that there is no significant change in that relationship 
when CBFM is additionally present at any level of income.  
Logit Model m7   
Monitoring b/se Odds Ratio 
loginc 0.371** 1.450** 
 (0.140) (0.203) 
anyCBFM -0.022 0.979 
 (0.385) (0.376) 
Female headed -0.186 0.83 
 (0.773) (0.641) 
age 0.024** 1.025** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
education 0.038 1.039 
 (0.074) (0.077) 
constant -8.099** 0.000** 
 (1.75) (0.001) 
 + p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<.01 
Table 11 Logit Results for Participation in Monitoring 
 The logistic regression of income on participation in state and JFM forest harvesting revealed a 
positive effect of income (model 8 see table 12). For every one unit increase in the log of income the 
odds a household had greater than average participation in forest harvesting increased by 44.4% (odds 
ratio 1.44) which was significant at the p<.01 level. Female headed households had significantly lower 
odds of participation in forest harvesting relative to other households with a decrease of 87.9% (odds 
ratio 0.12). There was no significant effect of CBFM on the likelihood of participating in forest harvesting 
in JFM or state forests. 
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Logit Model m8     
Harvest b/se   Odds Ratio 
loginc 0.368** 1.444** 
 (0.139) (0.201) 
anyCBFM -0.629 0.533 
 (0.579) (0.309) 
Female headed -2.113*  0.121*  
 (0.997) (0.12) 
age -0.008 0.992 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
education -0.05 0.951 
 (0.049) (0.046) 
constant -5.341** 0.005** 
 (1.896) (0.009) 
  + p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<.01 
Table 12 Logit Results Participation in Harvesting 
The models of participation in rule creation revealed no statistically significant relationships with 
income or presence of CBFM (model 9 see table 13). The only significant predictor was household age. 
In agreement with the previous models of participation age slightly increased the odds of participation 
in rule creation by 4.7% (odds ratio of 1.047) for every additional year in age of the household head.  
Logit Model 
Create Rules 
m9 
b/se   
Odds 
ratio 
loginc 0.171 1.186 
 (0.148) (0.175) 
anyCBFM 0.063 1.065 
 (0.636) (0.678) 
Female headed -0.015 0.985 
 (0.575) (0.566) 
age 0.046*  1.047*  
 (0.018) (0.019) 
education 0.1 1.105 
 (0.115) (0.127) 
constant -8.085** 0.000** 
 (2.747) (0.001) 
   + p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<.01 
Table 13 Logit Model of Participation in Rule Creation 
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The outcome of the logistic regression models of household participation indicate that wealth 
status increases the likelihood a household participates in monitoring or harvesting of their JFMN or 
state forests.  Presence of CBFM has no apparent effect on the likelihood a household participates in 
these institutions of forest management and use in reserve forests. The relationship between wealth 
status and predicted participation is potential indication that monitoring and forest harvesting are 
dominated by wealthy elites and may not be equally accessible to poorer households. Wealthy elites 
may be benefitting from the knowledge and influence gained by participating in forest monitoring 
activities which may feed into their greater participation in forest harvesting. Conversely wealthier 
households may harvest more forest resources and therefor have a higher stake in forest monitoring to 
help ensure rule compliance and enforcement. There does not appear to be any positive spillover effects 
introduced by the presence of more democratic forms of forest management through CBFM on 
participation or access to institutions of JFM and state forest governance and use.   
Section 6.4  
Forest Governance Outcomes; Perceptions of Management Functioning and Benefits 
Following on the descriptive and quantitative analysis of factors related to households’ 
engagement in various aspects of forest livelihoods and governance qualitative data on households’ 
perceptions of forest benefits and governance functioning are explored. Household’s responses to 
categorical and open-ended questions describe household perceptions of how forest management 
functions and who benefits. These responses are compared across different management types to 
further explore whether the additional presence of CBFM processes are potentially related to any 
marked improvements in outcomes. This exploration aims to further reveal whether the presence of 
democratic CBFM processes creates better access to forest benefits and local level engagement in forest 
management.  
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To do so households’ perceptions of which group 1). Is most active and 2). Benefitting from 
forest management. Households answered these questions in regards to their state, JFM or CBFM forest 
management regimes separately. Further, household responses pertaining to JFM and state 
management are compared where they are the sole forest management type and where CBFM co-
occurs. Additionally the outcomes for the same questions in regards to CBFM processes are also 
provided for comparison.  
Households responses to which group is most active in forest management are indicative of 
potential differences in how forest governance operates and whom it engages. In state forest 
management a greater proportion of households’ perceive that the district forest officer or “other” are 
most active in management when CBFM is additionally present (see fig.10). The presence of CBFM 
processes in villages with state forest management would likely involve new outside actors including the 
DFO, whereas in communities with only state forest management outside actors such as a DFO may be 
less involved. However there is no indication of greater community or local government activity in state 
forest management compared to sites that also have CBFM processes. However the additional presence 
of CBFM with state forest management is associated with a decrease in households responding, “don’t 
know” to which group is most active in management. This could indicate increased awareness around 
forest management in general when CBFM is present. However there does not appear to be any clear 
improvements, such as greater perceived involvement of community level institutions or the community 
at large in management, when CBFM processes occur alongside of state forest management. 
Households’ perceptions of the most active group in management of JFM forests show little 
variation when CBFM is additionally present. Given that both JFM and CBFM operate through the same 
existing local government institutions this result is not unsurprising. Again uncertainty about who is 
most active is slightly less common among households in JFM sites that also have CBFM underway.  The 
DFO/DNRO was the second most common response for all JFM respondents followed by members of 
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the village forest committee and village government. Slightly more households responded that most or 
all villagers were the most active group when CBFM processes were present. This is a potentially positive 
indication, however the difference is not drastic. Overall, perceptions of which group is most active in 
forest management were similar in regards to JFM forest management regardless of whether CBFM was 
also present in a village.  
Households’ perceptions of who was most active in CBFM forest management revealed similar 
patterns to perceptions of JFM and state forest management. The only notable difference was that the 
majority of households responded that their village government was the most active group. Whereas for 
JFM and state management the most common response was, “don’t know” followed by the DFO in 
regards to CBFM processes there appears to be greater clarity and engagement of a local government 
body in forest management. As the most decentralized form of management this is a positive, although 
not entirely surprising result as this is how CBFM is designed to function. There is only a very small 
percentage of households that believe most or all villagers are the most active in forest management, 
which is proportionally less than this group received in regards to JFM or state forest management. As 
the most democratic form of forest management I anticipated CBFM to be associated with greater 
involvement of the community at large and community institutions. While local government is perceived 
to be more active under CBFM, most or all villagers were not commonly perceived as the most active 
group. Overall the results showed no strong differences in perceptions of which group are most active in 
forest management for CBFM. Further, there is no indication of positive spillover effects from CBFM on 
the impressions of community involvement in JFM or state forest management.  
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Figure 8 Forest Management Outcomes by Regime 
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 Perceptions of who benefits the most from forest management were also compared for any 
spillover effects or differences in outcomes by regime type (see fig. 9-11). Uncertainty about the 
distribution of management benefits was the most common response regardless of forest management 
type. In state forest management uncertainty about who benefits was less frequent when CBFM was 
also present. However more households responding their DFO or “other” benefit the most account for 
this trade off in uncertainty. Fewer households responded that the majority of villagers benefited the 
most from management when CBFM was present alongside state management. In regards to JFM forest 
management there is very little variation in the perceptions of who benefits from management when 
CBFM is present. These results do not lend any support to the notion that CBFM is having any positive 
spillover effects on forest management outcomes in state or JFM forest governance. However, 
responses to CBFM management processes show some potentially positive shifts in who directly 
benefits the most from CBFM management. Although don’t know is still the most common response, 
there is a greater number of households responding that local institutions of governance or most 
villagers are benefitting from forest management.      
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Figure 9 Perceptions of State Forest Management Benefits 
 
Figure 10 Perceptions of Forest Management Benefits JFM 
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Figure 11 Perceptions of Forest Management Benefits CBFM 
To better understand what types of benefits households receive from forests open-ended 
questions were grouped by common themes to compare the frequency of different kinds of responses 
by management type. While the previous quantitative analysis focused on relationships between wealth 
and management on different measures of direct forest use there are a range of other possible benefits 
forests might provide households. Therefor households own explanations and examples of forest 
benefits are compared to capture the range of potential direct and indirect benefits households 
acknowledge and receive from forests and whether these differ by forest management.  
The range and frequency of forest benefits households derived from state forests are shown in 
fig. 12. Environmental services were the most frequently cited type of forest benefit (43%) obtained 
from state forests. Examples of services included rainfall, water catchment, clean air and water, shade, 
and biodiversity of plants and wildlife. Direct forest benefits were less frequently reported but included 
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non-timber forest products (16%), timber (6%) and direct forest income from the sale of products 
(1.5%). Forest products included firewood, poles, medicinal plants, grass, and timber. Over a third of 
respondents in state forests could not cite any forest benefits (39%). Of the third that did not report 
benefits most responded that there simply are none at present (16%) while others offered a variety of 
critical factors constraining forest benefits. The most frequent reason cited was strict protection 
preventing entry to the forest (13%). Respondents described that Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) 
owns the forests and “will chase anyone off trespassing” (Respondent in state forest). A handful of 
households reported issues such as corruption, lack of community participation or lack of knowledge as 
reasons preventing households from obtaining forest benefits. Therefor overall in state forests 
households seems to acknowledge environmental services as an indirect benefit and less commonly 
describe any direct forest benefits. Many households report no forest benefits and acknowledge the 
forest reserve status as a limiting factor.   
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Figure 12 State Forest Benefits 
 In regards to JFM environmental services were also the most common forest benefit described 
(57.64%). Households described a similar range of environmental services again mostly pertaining to 
preservation of clean water, air and biodiversity (see fig. 13).  Less households reported directly 
harvesting forest products compared to state forests, only 9% reported harvesting non-timber forest 
products and less than 1% reported timber as a forest benefit. Overall though less households in JFM 
reported no benefits or any mitigating reasons preventing benefits (23% in JFM compared to 39% in 
state forests). The most common factors described as preventing forest benefits in JFM included 
protection status (8%), distance to forest (7.5%), lack of knowledge (3%), and corruption (2%). It appears 
in JFM households are less likely to describe that they receive no benefits at all from forests and more 
likely to acknowledge environmental services as a direct benefit despite citing less direct forest use. 
Households are less likely to report specific forest products as a benefit from JFM indicating households 
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may not be obtaining sufficient resources to perceive NTFP or timber as direct household benefits under 
JFM.   
 
Figure 13 JFM Forest Benefits 
 Perceptions of forest benefits in CBFM sites show a greater diversity of responses (see fig. 14). 
The most common benefit reported was NTFP (33%) followed by environmental services (28%), timber 
(5%), tourism (5%) and conserving forests for the future (4%). Still 38% of households reported no 
benefit and or described an issue preventing forest benefits. Common reasons preventing households 
from obtaining benefits included distance to forest (6%) lack of knowledge (4.5%), insufficient forest 
resources (3.5%), they don’t know (3.5%) and protection status (2.5%). 
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Figure 14 CBFM Forest Benefits 
Overall households describe a greater variety of forest benefits in CBFM including greater direct 
forest use and income generating activities such as tourism. While households in CBFM still describe 
environmental services as a forest benefit, they are also able describe different means of direct forest 
use or income generating activities as tangible benefits. Households under JFM are the least likely to 
describe direct forest use (such as NTFP and timber) as a household benefit but do recognize 
environmental services provided by forests. Issues around mismanagement, corruption and elite 
capture are not frequently cited as preventing access to forest benefits across any management types.  
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CHAPTER. 7 DISCUSSION 
 Overall, the results of both the quantitative and qualitative analysis indicate that CBFM is not 
producing markedly different outcomes around forest governance or livelihoods outcomes at present 
for households within this study. While it was hypothesized that a more decentralized and democratic 
forest regime would increase equitable access to forest benefits and participation in forest governance 
institutions, the results from this study largely do not support these predictions. Specifically the 
hypothesis that CBFM would create more equitable results, where access to participation in forest 
activities would be less dependent on household wealth status did not find substantial support through 
analysis. The greatest determinant of participation and access to institutions of forest governance and 
forest livelihoods was household wealth status, which revealed significant results across nearly all 
measures in this study. Despite failing to confirm my hypothesis, these results fit with other existing 
work supporting a picture of insufficient and inequitable livelihood outcomes from decentralized forest 
management in practice in Tanzania (Rantala et al. 2012, Rantala and German 2013, Persha and Blomley 
2009, Lund and Treue 2008).  
In this study household participation in forest monitoring, frequency of forest harvesting, the 
value of charcoal and the variety of forest products a household harvested were all positively related to 
wealth status and not substantially affected by the presence of CBFM processes. The relative capital 
advantages a wealthier household has at its disposal seem to enable greater access to participation in 
both forest governance and harvesting activities regardless of forest management context. Despite 
policy hopes that CBFM will be more equitable and “pro-poor” it appears that there may not be a 
substantial shift in local power dynamics impacting the advantage that comes with greater wealth 
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status; despite the same de jure rights and promise of democratic redistribution resulting access (as 
defined by Ribot and Peluso) is still inequitable.   
The presence of CBFM forest management processes did have a significant moderating effect on 
the likelihood of harvesting a greater variety of products for the wealthiest households. If this effect 
held with larger sample sizes or under multilevel modeling approaches in future studies this could 
indicate that the presence of democratic CBFM processes might be curtailing elite capture of certain 
forest resources for the wealthiest households. However, this moderating effect was not related to 
significantly different outcomes at most levels of income and had no positive affect on the poorest 
households as CBFM policy is intended to. While the quantitative analysis did not reveal substantial, 
positive outcomes attributed to CBFM on most forest use indicators the descriptive analysis provides 
some reasons for cautious optimism. Households recognized a greater variety of forest benefits from 
CBFM in comparison to centralized or co-managed regimes.  Greater frequency and variety of direct 
forest use and income generating activities were reported as benefits of CBFM as opposed to 
predominantly indirect benefits (mainly ecosystem services) attributed to both JFM and state-managed 
forests. Better access to a greater variety of forest resources can support forest livelihood activities and 
household wellbeing. However any livelihood impacts from forest benefits were not captured by the 
quantitative analysis in this study and may not be substantial or consistent at present. Therefore despite 
some indication that decentralized forest management was related to improved access to direct forest 
use these benefits were not detected through the quantitative analysis to support a picture of 
significant livelihood improvements related to CBFM. Further there is no evidence in this study that the 
presence of CBFM is associated with improved access to any forest benefits for the poorest households 
as decentralized policy is intended.  
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 Further, CBFM forest governance does not appear to be functioning any differently than JFM or 
state forest governance across the chosen indicators nor have any substantial spillover effects. It was 
hypothesized that CBFM would both improve outcomes within its own institutions of governance and 
positively affect state and JFM processes and outcomes. As CBFM is designed to increase community 
participation in forest governance and actively engage local institutions it was predicted that CBFM 
would have greater and more equitable participation and additionally increase participation across JFM 
and state management processes. Participation in forest monitoring and rule formation can serve as an 
opportunity for individuals to gain knowledge about other users’ behavior, the state of the resource 
system and shape the rules that govern them (Ostrom 1990). It was predicted that CBFM would create 
greater access to participation in these institutions, an indicator of “good governance”. However, this 
was not supported through the analysis of household participation. Therefore despite granting greater 
and more autonomous rights over forest management CBFM may not be increasing local participation in 
these institutions at present.  
The analysis revealed that perceptions of forest management functioning and benefit allocation 
do not substantially improve in response to state/JFM processes when CBFM was additionally present. 
Responses are still dominated by a lack of knowledge of who is in charge of and benefitting from forest 
management. Following “don’t know” the most common perception was that centralized and external 
actors dominate management as opposed to any community level groups or the community at large. 
The logistic regression analysis of JFM and state participation scores indicated no statistically significant 
variation with presence of CBFM. The mere presence of democratic forest management processes in a 
village were not associated with increased household participation in institutions of forest governance in 
this study further providing no support for the positive spillover effects hypothesis proposed by 
Vyamana (2009). There is some positive indication that households perceive that village institutions are 
more active in CBFM forest management and that the community and community institutions receive a 
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greater proportion of management benefits compared to JFM or state-management processes. Despite 
these subtle differences, the overall picture is that forest governance processes are not substantively 
different within CBFM management and therefor are also not providing any positive impacts on JFM and 
state-managed institutions of forest governance as detected in this study.  
 Despite finding little support for the stated hypothesis these results are important in what they 
indicate CBFM is not currently doing; despite greater rights and autonomy granted to communities 
under CBFM the potential benefits of the democratic dividend are not substantial at present. However, 
most CBFM processes are young (less than 10 years old) and benefits may take time to accrue 
particularly if communities are foregoing harvest for the future. Caution has been raised that democratic 
decentralization is a process not an end point and takes time to transition and accrue benefits (Ribot et 
al. 2010). 
Finally, this study and its results are limited by several factors. First despite being a large study 
of forest decentralization outcomes compared to existing work in Tanzania, the sample size was still 
small and potentially insufficient to detect outcomes and underlying processes. Specifically the 
instability of the estimates chosen in this study created wide confidence intervals around the estimated 
effects increasing the possibility of false negatives in hypothesis testing. Underlying relationships 
between wealth and regime status on forest governance and livelihood outcomes may well not have 
been captured. Further the methods chosen for this study have several limiting factors. While clustering 
the standard errors for the estimates of all variables at the village level accounts for heteroskedasticity 
introduced by autocorrelation it does not decompose the village level and universal effects within each 
model. In future analysis, the nested structure of the data could be accounted for using hierarchal linear 
modeling as a preferred tactic to address the nested structure of the data and better account for multi-
level effects. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
 Decentralized forest management continues to expand encompassing both a greater total area 
of remaining tropical forests and numbers of impoverished rural people it engages (Sunderlin et al. 
2008, Jagger et al. 2014). Despite optimism that decentralized management will improve forest 
conservation, governance and livelihood outcomes existing empirical evaluations of these claims do not 
present any cohesive or clear picture. Mixed findings and uncertainty are particularly common across 
governance and livelihood outcomes (Jagger et al. 2014). Existing work highlights the apparent 
disconnect between the theoretical benefits of decentralization and it’s less than stellar empirical record 
and tries to link causal processes and mechanisms related to failed or successful outcomes.  
As a “pro poor” policy decentralized management such as CBFM is designed to increase 
equitable access to forest resources and engage democratic participation in local institutions of forest 
governance. Recent work has highlighted the importance of forest governance as a mediator for forest 
conservation and livelihood outcomes as well as the importance of substantial livelihood improvements 
as a slow feedback into the social ecological system (Persha et al. 2011, Dietz, Ostrom and Stern 2003). 
It’s been demonstrated that tangible livelihood benefits may be necessary to ensure the sustainability of 
CPR management systems and can improve forest conservation outcomes (Pagdee et al. 2006). 
Therefore a better understanding of how decentralization is affecting interrelated governance and 
livelihood outcomes is important for the durability of these management systems as well as increasing 
the potential for forests to contribute to rural poverty alleviation (Sunderlin et al. 2005). This study 
aimed to address the dearth of understanding on household level livelihood and governance outcomes 
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under decentralized management in Tanzania. Among the existing evaluations of governance and 
livelihood outcomes the majority explore only qualitative data or limited statistical analysis that restrict 
the generalizability of their results. This study aimed to extend existing work on decentralized outcomes 
in Tanzania to better understand whether CBFM is creating more equitable access to participation in 
aspects of forest governance and livelihoods through a study design more robust to case based specific 
variation in local context. Overall, the findings from this study do not support that CBFM is likely creating 
more equitable access to forest resources or participation in forest governance institutions for the 
poorest households at present. CBFM was not associated with any substantial differences in the 
functioning and governance of forest management institutions. There was also no clear support for 
CBFM either creating more equitable access to forest resources or improving overall livelihood 
outcomes. While this study did not directly test for mediating pathways between forest governance and 
livelihood outcomes, the murky findings on governance outcomes may be related to lack luster 
livelihood benefits as both seem relatively inaccessible and unaffected by the presence of more 
“democratic” processes aa present. Often decentralization lacks sufficient transfer of power, autonomy 
or accountability to deliver the benefits of the democratic dividend (Ribot 2002). Further exploring the 
links between these outcomes is a direction for future research to better understand the links between 
the functioning of local governance institutions and access to forest livelihoods.  
A final unique contribution of this study was further exploration of possible spillover effects 
related to the presence of CBFM processes in a village. While a recent study in Tanzania observed that 
the presence of CBFM created positive spillover effects, i.e. effects that transcended the boundaries of 
the specific CBFM reserve and influenced the management of surrounding JFM and state forests 
(Vyamana 2009), these findings have not been corroborated or investigated further to the knowledge of 
the author. However, these findings were based on small samples and descriptive comparisons alone. 
The potential for institutional spillover effects is currently not well understood, particularly in regards to 
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decentralized forest management outcomes despite the rapid expansion of CBFM alongside of existing, 
more centralized forest regimes (Jagger et al. 2014). This study provides a robust counter point to 
Vyamana’s findings and revealed no statistically significant outcomes nor substantial qualitative support 
for positive spillover effects from CBFM. The presence of CBFM in a village did not appear to improve 
perceptions of how JFM or state forest management functioned, who benefitted and was not associated 
with statistically different outcomes for household participation in monitoring, rulemaking or forest 
harvesting. Future work would benefit from combining both multi-level, robust quantitative approaches 
and richer observational and qualitative data to better understand the effects CBFM is having, or 
importantly not having, on households’ access to participation and resulting benefits from forest 
governance and resources within and beyond its own borders and institutions.  
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APPENDIX 
Variable Name Description 
loginc Natural log of per capita income 
lowestquintiles Dummy variable measuring household asset based wealth status using the lowest 2 
quintiles derived from the PCA 
0= not member of the poorest two quantiles 
1= member of the poorest two quantiles 
anyCBFM Dummy variable for presence of CBFM 
0= JFM or state without CBFM 
1= JFM or state with CBFM 
prod2cats Binary measure of the variety of forest products harvested 
0= none or 1 type of forest product 
1= greater than one forest products  
fuelwoodvalue Natural log of the estimated value of fuel wood harvested in the past month 
charcoalvalue Natural log of the estimated value of charcoal harvested in the past month 
subsistencefuel Dummy variable for subsistence use for fuelwood harvested 
0= not subsistence use 
1= subsistence use 
subsistencecharc Dummy variable for subsistence use for charcoal harvested 
0= not subsistence use 
1= subsistence use 
monitoringOther Binary measure of households’ participation in monitoring activities in state or JFM 
forests 
0= never/rarely monitor 
1= sometimes/often monitor 
harvestOther Binary measure of households’ participation in forest harvesting in state or JFM 
forests 
0= never/rarely harvest 
1= sometimes/often harvest 
createOther Binary measure of households’ participation in rule creation in state or JFM forests 
0= never/rarely create 
1= sometimes/often create 
monitoringCBFM Binary measure of households’ participation in monitoring activities in CBFM 
0= never/rarely monitor 
1= sometimes/often monitor 
harvestCBFM Binary measure of households’ participation in forest harvesting in CBFM 
0= never/rarely harvest 
1= sometimes/often harvest 
createCBFM Binary measure of households’ participation in rule creation in CBFM 
0= never/rarely create 
1= sometimes/often create 
age Age of household head 
education Years of education household head 
femaleheaded Dummy variable  
0= not female headed 
1= female headed 
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